# 1NC

### 1

#### Interpretation – “economic engagement” is an iterated process across multiple areas to influence state behavior – only trade and aid are topical-fx

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### Violation – []

#### That’s a voting issue –

#### a) Predictable limits – they explode the topic which overstretches the research burden and incentivizes a shift to generics – hurts critical thinking and produces stale strategizing, hurting research skills. That prevents rigorous testing of the aff which hurts advocacy construction.

#### b) Ground – they bypass topic offense based on commodity trading, diplomatic agreements, and investment DAs like SOI. Non-trade affs steal international CP ground which is key to testing federal action on an international topic.

#### Default to competing interpretations – most objective.

### 2

#### Chinese engagement with Latin America is trending upwards – it’s key to CCP export markets and energy imports

Myers and Hongbo 13 (Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue, Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, each answering a question from the Inter-American Dialogue “How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China?” http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210)

A: Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue: "Latin America became a strategically important market for Chinese exporters a few years ago following decreases in demand for Chinese goods from Europe and the United States. Chinese exports to Europe fell 9 percent in 2011 in comparison with export levels in 2010, for example, and exports to the United States fell 5 percent. As U.S. and European demand continues to lag, Latin American nations should expect sustained interest in their markets and new market- and efficiency-seeking investments. As China continues its process of industrial upgrading, Latin America will also see more in the way of high-tech goods, as well as marketing of distinctly Chinese brands. Chinese cars are already being sold in several Latin American countries, including Brazil, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia. And Chinese cell phones and computers are increasingly popular among Latin American consumers. As the former LAC director general at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Yang is uniquely familiar with both the promises and pitfalls of trade with Latin America. While Latin America remains an appealing market for exports, Chinese producers and officials are painfully aware of growing protectionism in response to China's market-seeking endeavors. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences cited nationalization and trade protectionism trends among the top 20 notable events in the region in 2012. China expects to avoid protectionist measures by building mutually beneficial, 'win-win' trade relations. Chinese government and commercial entities in Latin America will indeed be working to build stronger trade relations in the coming years." A: Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing: "China regards Latin America as a promising strategic trade partner not only for diversifying export destinations, but also for safeguarding commodity import security. According to official statistics, Chinese exports to Latin America represented 6.74 percent of its total exports for the first nine months of 2012. Compared to the United States, European Union and Asia, Latin America has absorbed a marginal share of China's fast export expansion. From 2003 to 2011, the region's share of China's export volume only rose from 2.71 percent to 6.41 percent. Chinese policymakers expect to build a more sustainable and balanced trade relationship with Latin America. This issue has been widely negotiated both in political and commercial circles from the two sides. However, the bilateral effort still needs to find an efficient way to achieve satisfactory results, particularly for those countries that have a trade deficit with China. China continues to increase its imports from Latin America-with the region supplying 3.62 percent of China's total imports in 2003 to 7.13 percent in 2012. China's slowdown in 2012 caused serious concern in commodity-exporting countries in South America. Nonetheless, Chinese trade with Latin America in 2012 is estimated at more than $250 billion, higher than the year prior. Chinese business groups will attach great importance to the market volume in Latin America, but the export opportunities will also depend on strong economic growth in this region. In 2013, China's highlighted macroeconomic policy device for sustaining stable growth is to accelerate the pace of high-quality urbanization, which will necessitate increasing imports of mineral, agricultural and energy products from Latin America."

#### Bolstering US influence pushes China out – Columbia proves it determines contracts

Ellis 12

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At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### China’s exports are key to a sustainable economy – recent shocks mean it’s on the brink

Holland 7/9 (Tom, writer of the South China Morning Post’s Monitor column, internally citing statistics from ADBI, the Asian Development Bank Institute, Dr. Yuqing Xing, professor of economics an director of Asian economic policy at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, PhD in economics from the University of Illinois—Urbana-Champaign, MA and BA from Peking University, South China Morning Post Monitor, July 9, 2013, “Despite rebalancing, exports still vitally important to China,” <http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1278239/despite-rebalancing-exports-still-vitally-important-china>, alp)

Unfortunately, the figure for gross exports isn't much use either. In an economy where all the value of all exports was produced domestically, then gross exports would give a good idea of external demand. But real supply chains don't work like that. Chinese factories import flash memory chips from Japan, displays from Korea and processors from the United States, which they then assemble into smartphones for sale around the world. So although the face value of China's exports may be high, the value added by China's factories is often relatively low. But although gross exports aren't much help in gauging the true importance of external demand, net exports don't work either. If all China's imports were components destined for re-export, the net figure would do the trick. But they aren't. Imports are also consumed domestically, not least by Chinese buying their own smartphones. To estimate the real contribution of external demand, we would have to account for the proportion of China's imports destined for re-export after assembly. Although these processing imports have fallen relative to China's total imports over recent years, as the first chart shows, they still make up a sizeable share of China's overall inbound goods trade. In an attempt to do exactly that, Xing Yuqing and Manisha Pradhananga at the Asian Development Bank Institute have come up with a measure of external demand which strips out China's processing imports. Then, for good measure, they have factored in an allowance for foreign direct investment into China, which remains driven largely by external, rather than domestic, demand. They found that although the share of external demand in China's GDP has fallen from its high of 28 per cent reached in 2007, in 2011 it still accounted for 22 per cent of overall economic output. As the second chart shows, that's 10 times as great as the share implied by the net export figure commonly used by economists. Xing and Pradhananga conclude that despite efforts to rebalance the economy towards domestic consumption, China is still heavily dependent on demand from the rest of the world, and that its growth remains highly vulnerable to external shocks. In other words, if tomorrow's trade numbers are as dismal as many analysts expect, it will be an ominous sign indeed for China's growth outlook.

#### Chinese economic decline goes global and causes nuclear lashout

Buzan and Foot 04 – professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

### 3

#### Will pass—top of docket

Clifford, 12/30 (Mike, 12/30/2013, “Immigration Reform Supporters: “Positive Signs” Headed into 2014,” <http://www.publicnewsservice.org/2013-12-30/immigrant-issues/immigration-reform-supporters-positive-signs-headed-into-2014/a36538-1)>)

NEW YORK - Supporters of comprehensive immigration reform fell short of their goal in 2013, but several things happened in December to swing momentum in their direction, they say. The first positive sign, according to Jim Wallis, Sojourners president and founder, was the House and Senate working together to pass a budget bill.

And, while Speaker Boehner has said immigration reform would have to wait until next year, Wallis said there are signs Republicans are ready to act.

"I hear Republican leaders - Goodlatte from Judiciary - saying this will be a top priority in 2014," Wallis said. "John Boehner has hired a really talented aide to help with immigration - she knows the topic well, and she's for reform."

At his final 2013 news conference, President Obama called on House members to pass the immigration reform measure approved by the Senate, but Speaker Boehner has said he won't bring that version up for a vote.

Patty Kupfer, managing director, America's Voice, said key Republicans like Long Island Congressman Peter King either need to step up and co-sponsor the Senate-passed bill or reach across the aisle to a Democrat and craft a bill themselves.

"Peter King is probably one of about 40 Republicans who we see as critical to moving reform forward," Kupfer said, "and if they don't like what's on the table, they need to be able to produce something and say what they stand for."

#### ( ) Obama’s capital key to ensuring passage

Orlando Sentinel, 11/1 (11/1/2013, “What we think: It'll take both parties to clear immigration logjam,” <http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-11-01/news/os-ed-immigration-reform-congress-20131031_1_immigration-reform-comprehensive-reform-house-republicans>, JMP)

For those who thought the end of the government shutdown would provide a break from the partisan bickering in Washington, think again. The battle over comprehensive immigration reform could be every bit as contentious.

Polls show the popular momentum is there for comprehensive reform, which would include a path to citizenship for many of the nation's 11 million undocumented immigrants. But it'll take plenty of political capital from President Obama and leaders in both parties on Capitol Hill to make it happen.

Immigration-reform activists, who have been pushing for reform for years, are understandably impatient. This week police arrested 15 who blocked traffic at a demonstration in Orlando.

There are plenty of selling points for comprehensive immigration reform. An opportunity for millions of immigrants to get on the right side of the law. Stronger border security. The chance for law enforcement to focus limited resources on real threats to public safety, instead of nannies and fruit pickers. A more reliable work force to meet the needs of key industries. Reforms to let top talent from around the world stay here after studying in U.S. universities.

The Senate passed its version of comprehensive immigration in June. It includes all of the benefits above. Its path to citizenship requires undocumented immigrants to pay fines, learn English, pass a criminal background check and wait more than a decade.

So far, House Republicans have balked, taking a piecemeal rather than comprehensive approach. Many members fear being challenged from the right for supporting "amnesty."

Yet polls show the public supports comprehensive reform. In June, a Gallup poll found 87 percent of Americans — including 86 percent of Republicans — support a pathway to citizenship like the one outlined in the Senate bill.

Florida Republican Sen. Marco Rubio took flak from tea-party supporters for spearheading the comprehensive bill. Now, apparently aiming to mend fences, he says immigration should be handled piecemeal. He's politically savvy enough to know that's a dead end.

But comprehensive reform won't have a chance without President Obama making full use of his bully pulpit to promote it, emphasizing in particular all that undocumented immigrants would need to do to earn citizenship. House Democratic leaders will have to underscore the president's message.

And House Republican leaders will need to convince their members that comprehensive reform would be better for the economy, better for security, and better for the future of their party.

#### ( ) New era of cooperation will lead to deals on immigration --- controversial issues will spoil the détente

WSJ, 12/30 (“Obama Seeks Way to Right His Ship; Exiting 2013 in His Weakest Political Position, the President Faces a Basic Strategic Choice,” 12/30/2013, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304361604579290264084633016>))

President Barack Obama exits 2013 in the weakest political position of his presidency and now faces a basic strategic choice: Does he try to recover by working with Republicans in Congress, or by confronting them heading into next year's midterm elections?

By almost any measure, 2013 was, as Democratic pollster Peter Hart put it, "a terribly ragged year" for the president, who saw his approval ratings plunge and his agenda stall. One glimmer of light emerged at year's end, when the two parties agreed on a deal to settle long-festering budget disputes through the new year.

That now leaves it unclear whether Washington is entering a new phase in which the president seeks more compromises with Republicans to move at least part of his agenda through Congress, or whether he instead strikes out on his own by using executive action as a way to advance his program while underscoring his philosophical differences with the GOP on issues such as a higher minimum wage and extended unemployment benefits.

For most of 2013, Mr. Obama has been unable to move key proposals such as new controls on gun sales. Meantime, his indecision on whether to actively engage in Syria's civil war has hurt his image as a leader as that conflict festers and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remains in power.

Worst of all for the White House, of course, was the disastrous rollout of the Affordable Care Act, and the deep blow to the president's personal credibility from the public's realization that his declaration that Americans could keep their health-insurance plans when the new law kicks in wasn't turning out to be entirely true.

Now, "the Affordable Care Act hovers over everything," says Mike McCurry, former White House press secretary under Bill Clinton.

The toll can be seen in the arc of public opinion in Wall Street Journal/NBC news polling through 2013. Mr. Obama's job approval has fallen to 43% from 52% at the start of the year. The percentage of those polled who give him good marks for being honest and straightforward has dropped 10 points to 37%.

Mr. Obama's main consolation is that Republicans continue to fare even worse in public estimation. Indeed, his political high point in 2013 came when congressional Republicans shot themselves in the foot by allowing the government to shut down in October in a dispute over funding the president's health law.

Republican leaders were so singed by the experience that they moved swiftly this month to strike the compromise budget plan that will keep the government funded through next year. Then, House Speaker John Boehner (R., Ohio) forcefully quashed complaints by the party's tea-party wing that the new deal didn't cut spending sufficiently

The emergence of a large bloc of House Republicans who voted in favor of that compromise has created the possibility that Mr. Obama may be able to work out at least a few deals on other issues.

"The jury's still out on whether or not the budget agreement was a one-off or a sign of things to come," says Rep. Chris Van Hollen of Maryland, the top Democrat on the House Budget Committee.

Mr. Van Hollen says an early test will come when the parties try to reach an understanding to raise the debt ceiling, due to be hit around the beginning of March.

If there is a new phase of cooperation, he says, that might open the door to deals on more infrastructure spending, corporate tax reform and, crucially, an overhaul of immigration laws.

Rep. Kevin McCarthy, the third-ranking Republican in the House, says the budget deal "does allow us to get more done," but adds that compromises are more likely between House and Senate leaders than with the White House. He predicts much of Mr. Obama's effort in the new year will be on keeping Democratic supporters from abandoning him as he tries to get his new health program working better.

That brings Mr. Obama to his key strategic choice: Does he focus on trying to craft compromises with Republicans to show skeptical voters he is making Washington work? Or does he work around Congress, striking out on his own with executive actions, while attacking the GOP for failing to cooperate?

The question of whether more deals with congressional Republicans are possible is "perhaps the question when it comes to predicting how 2014 will play out," says a senior White House official. "Our approach will be to test as much as possible for principled compromise where Republicans are willing, but also to push ahead with nonlegislative solutions where Congress stonewalls."

#### Increasing green cards generates an effective base of IT experts- solves cybersecurity

McLarty 9 (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

¶ We have seen, when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States.¶ We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be done to try to generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the United States, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward.¶ MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to strengthen, I think, our system, our security needs.

#### Cyberterrorism will cause accidental launch that triggers the Dead Hand and nuclear war

Fritz 9 (Jason, BS – St. Cloud, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, Study Commissioned on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, July, www.icnnd.org/Documents/Jason\_Fritz\_Hacking\_NC2.doc)  
  
*Direct control of launch*   
The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have noted a Pentagon review, which showed a potential “electronic back door into the US Navy’s system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines” (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could potentially infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to “elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders” (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception that could subsequently be used to initiate a launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UK’s nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also be used to engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level official’s—anyone who has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect information to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres’ computer networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identified—a considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would be relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the decision making process, and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the world’s most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. “ \*\*[they cut off the paragraph]\*\* “In June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text “If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream” (Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments.

### Drugs

**No impact to naval power—air and land comparatively outweigh**

**Rhodes 5** - Dr. Edward Rhodes is dean for the Social and Behavioral Sciences at Rutgers University. A former International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, he has served in the Strategy and Concepts Branch of the Navy Staff, “. . . From the Sea” and Back Again Naval Power in the Second American Century, Naval War College Review, Spring 1999, Vol. 52, No. 2, http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Press/Newport-Papers/Documents/24-pdf.aspx, p. 172-6, CMR

The lack of evidence in support of a proposition is, of course, not evidence against that proposition; it is simply an absence of evidence. A priori, however, there is substantial reason to doubt the efficacy of littoral projection of naval power in shaping the peacetime environment. What is known, principally from studies of crises (about which more will be said below), regarding decisions to engage in aggression and states’ ability to understand or focus on power projected “from the sea” suggests a real danger that states will ignore or underestimate the capabilities inherent in American naval power. Moreover, even if it were shown to be the case that applying naval power “from the sea” has a significant positive impact on the peacetime environment, it would still remain to be demonstrated that it is a cost-effective means of creating that impact— that naval power is less expensive than alternative military means, such as subsidizing regional proxies, or than nonmilitary means, such as fostering trade and development or developing a specialized capacity for humanitarian relief. In crisis, the forward-deployed capacity to project power “from the sea” is touted as having an immediate deterrent effect—that is, dissuading an adversary who is tentatively considering going to war from following through on that idea. Here we do have some evidence; at very best, however, it must be regarded as offering mixed support for the Navy’s advocacy of a littoral approach. A variety of studies of conventional deterrence have been undertaken.60 While the research questions, underlying theoretical assumptions, and research methods have varied, several general findings emerge. The principal one is that immediate extended deterrence with conventional means— that is, using threats of conventional response to deter an adversary who is considering aggression against a third party—regularly fails, even in cases where commitments are “clearly defined, repeatedly publicized and defensible, and the committed [gives] every indication of its intentions to defend them by force if necessary.”61 Unlike nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence does not appear to result in a robust, stable stalemate but in a fluid and competitive strategic interaction that, at best, buys time during which underlying disputes or antagonisms can be resolved. The possession of decisive conventional military superiority and the visible demonstration of a resolve will not necessarily permit the United States to deter attacks on friends and interests. There are three reasons why immediate extended conventional deterrence is so problematic. First, potential aggressors are sometimes so strongly motivated to challenge the status quo that they are willing to run a high risk, or even the certainty, of paying the less-than-total costs of losing a war. Second, potential aggressors frequently conclude, correctly or incorrectly, that they have developed a military option that has politically or militarily “designed around” the deterrent threat. Third, there is considerable evidence that, particularly when they are under severe domestic stress, potential aggressors are unable to understand or respond rationally to deterrent threats. “Wishful thinking” by leaders who find themselves caught in a difficult situation appears to be an all-too common pathology. Further, and more germane to the issue of naval forward presence as a crisis deterrent tool, there is some evidence that because of the general insensitivity of potential aggressors to information, efforts to “signal” resolve through measures such as reinforcing or redeploying forces have limited effectiveness. If force movements are large enough to foreclose particular military options, they may forestall aggression. But as a means of indicating resolve and convincing an aggressor of the credibility of deterrent commitments, they do not generally appear to have an impact. All of this would seem to provide a reasonable argument against bothering to invest too heavily in forward military forces—or at least against believing that they offer much assurance of guaranteeing regional crisis stability. Ultimately, the key to preventing conflicts seems to be resolution of the underlying issues. At best, conventional deterrent efforts buy time. On the other hand, there is also some evidence that in some circumstances it is in fact possible to buy time. In particular, having forces in place that can deny potential aggressors a quick victory seems to tend to reinforce deterrence. The historical record suggests that the prospect of quick victory may be an important element in at least some aggressors’ calculations: the potential aggressor’s belief that he can either score a quick knockout or achieve a limited fait accompli appears to make aggression significantly more attractive. This offers some grounds for supporting forward naval presence. On the other hand, it also suggests the possibility that the Army is right and that if forward presence is to matter it needs to be on the ground, that an offshore presence of a potent but limited force, with only the implicit threat of surged ground forces, is less likely to have an impact, at least if the potential aggressor has limited goals. It also suggests the possibility that the symbolism of naval forward presence, serving as a reminder of the full weight and power the United States could ultimately bring to bear, may not be that important. In war, the argument that forward naval forces operating with a littoral strategy can have an important impact in the initial phases of the conflict, thereby preparing the ground for later U.S. successes, is doubtless true. While true, however, it may well be relevant in only a limited range of cases. Most potential conflicts or contingencies involve adversaries who are too small for this effect to matter much. Short of a major regional conflict (MRC), the superiority of U.S. military forces is sufficiently overwhelming that initial setbacks are not likely to be critically important. At the other extreme, in the case of a regional near-peer competitor—a Russia or a China—it is hard to imagine a littoral strategy having much of an impact: the amount of (nonnuclear) power that can be projected from the sea is trivial compared to the size of the adversary’s society or military establishment. What is left is a handful of admittedly very important cases: MRCs against such rogue states as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. What is interesting about these cases, however, is that there are not very many of them; their identity is known; and plans can be made in advance to move large amounts of land power and land-based air power to the theater at relatively short notice. The unique flexibility of naval power is, in these cases, relatively less valuable. Critics of the littoral strategy are, then, likely to argue that it is difficult to find cases in which a major investment in the capacity to project power from the sea makes sense. A small investment would be sufficient for most Third World contingencies, particularly if the United States does not demand real-time response. Even a large investment would be insufficient to deal with the great powers. And in the case of the mediumsized conflicts, the MRCs, paying for the extra flexibility of naval power may not be cost-effective. If there is reason for some cautious skepticism about the wisdom of building a navy for its capacity to project power from the sea, then perhaps it is worth thinking about some of the other things that the U.S. Navy does. In particular, it may be worthwhile to rethink the old Mahanian notion of sea power—not because Mahan was some sort of prophet and his ideas have eternal validity but because in the particular circumstances of the early twenty-first century his observations about the importance of the international commons per se may be relevant. The globalization of energy and food markets, as well as cross-industry trade in industrial goods, makes the sea remarkably important for national well-being, not simply for the well-being of the American nation but for that of most nations. By the middle of the next century, even China will be critically dependent on its access to the ocean. Global naval hegemony—that is, the capacity to exercise control over the world’s high seas—thus offers a powerful reason to invest in naval power. At best, control of the world’s oceanic highways may convey the power to shape the general evolution of international society. At minimum, it is likely to provide a veto power over many changes in international norms and regimes that the United States dislikes. Obviously, global naval hegemony does not convey an ability to dictate national policies or to control the social and political development or activities of other states. It is unlikely to offer much useful leverage if the Chinese choose to repeat Tienanmen Square, if there is a coup in Russia, or if Hutus and Tutsis resume killing each other. But then again, no approach to naval power is likely to offer much useful leverage in these cases. The point is that there are realistic limits to what naval power is likely to provide to a twenty-first-century America, and these may be well short of the goals encompassed within a liberal-internationalist vision of national security. These limits do not mean the United States should cease investing in naval power. They do, however, suggest that U. S. leaders and the U.S. Navy should not mislead themselves into believing that investing in the capacity for littoral warfare will necessarily yield an ability to control social and political developments around the world. Liberal internationalism can generate a dangerous hubris. A naval strategy that panders to the hubris is unlikely in the long run to serve the interests of either the nation or the Navy.

**Budget cuts to the navy empirically denies their impact**

**No challengers to naval power**

**Goure 10**—Vice President, Lexington Institute, PhD (Daniel, 2 July 2010, Can The Case Be Made For Naval Power?, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171>, RBatra)

This is no longer the case. The U.S. faces no great maritime challengers. While China appears to be toying with the idea of building a serious Navy **this is many years off**. Right now it appears to be designing a military to keep others, including the United States, away, out of the Western Pacific and Asian littorals. But even if it were seeking to build a large Navy, many analysts argue that other than Taiwan it is difficult to see a reason why Washington and Beijing would ever come to blows. Our former adversary, Russia, would have a challenge fighting the U.S. Coast Guard, much less the U.S. Navy. After that, there are no other navies of consequence. Yes, there are some scenarios under which Iran might attempt to close the Persian Gulf to oil exports, but how much naval power would really be required to reopen the waterway? Actually, the U.S. Navy would probably need more mine countermeasures capabilities than it currently possesses.

More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administration’s current plan is to rely on sea-based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed. The sea ways, sometimes called the global commons, are predominantly free of dangers. The exception to this is the chronic but relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively unimportant in today’s world.

**No china aggression**

Roger **Cliff,** Ph.D. in international relations, Princeton, M.A. in history (Chinese studies), University of California, San Diego, Assistant for Strategy Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and David A. Shlapak, Ph.D., senior international policy analyst, RAND Project Air Force Report, 20**07**, nkj

This situation would occur if China attempted to use force to achieve unification, the United States intervened, and China’s efforts were defeated, but Beijing refused to accept Taiwan’s independence.10 Analysis at RAND has found that a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan would likely be confined to the use of conventional weapons, even though both the United States and China possess nuclear weapons, and that it would not likely escalate into a broader war between the United States and China. That is, the war would be contained in the area around Taiwan; the main combatants would probably be limited to the United States, China, and Japan; and active hostilities would probably end after a relatively short time. Nonetheless, such a war would probably result in a bitter relationship between the United States and China, comparable in some ways to that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. China might well accelerate the buildup of its military capabilities with an eye toward waging a second, this time successful, campaign to claim Taiwan. This military competition would likely also be accompanied by a broader deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations, with mutual trade and investment falling dramatically or even ceasing, and each country demanding that its allies not cooperate with its rival. Countries in Asia might find themselves under pressure to choose between good relations with the United States and good relations with China. Nonetheless, even under these circumstances, the relationship between the United States and China after an inconclusive war over Taiwan would have important differences from the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is closely integrated into the world economy. With the exception of Japan, most countries in Asia would likely regard the importance of maintaining good relations with Beijing as outweighing any concerns about China having used force against Taiwan. They would resist U.S. pressure to choose between Washington and Beijing, preferring to maintain good relations with both. This logic would apply even more strongly to countries outside the region, which would be even less concerned about China’s use of force.

#### No Russia agression

**Ball ‘6**

(Desmond, Special Professor at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, “The Probabilities of ‘On the Beach,’” May, rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/wp/wp\_sdsc\_401.pdf)

The prospects of a nuclear war between the United States and Russia must now be deemed **fairly remote**. There are now no geostrategic issues that warrant nuclear competition and no inclination in either Washington or Moscow to provoke such issues. US and Russian strategic forces have been taken off day-to-day alert and their ICBMs ‘de-targeted’, greatly reducing the possibilities of war by accident, inadvertence or miscalculation. On the other hand, while the US-Russia strategic competition is in abeyance, there are several aspects of current US nuclear weapons policy which are profoundly disturbing. In December 2001 President George W. Bush officially announced that the United States was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, one of the mainstays of strategic nuclear arms control during the Cold War, with effect from June 2002, and was proceeding to develop and deploy an extensive range of both theatre missile defence and national missile defence (NMD) systems. The first anti-missile missile in the NMD system, designed initially to defend against limited missile attacks from China and North Korea, was installed at Fort Greely in Alaska in July 2004. The initial system, consisting of sixteen interceptor missiles at Fort Greely and four at Vandenberg Air Force in California, is expected to be operational by the end of 2005. The Bush Administration is also considering withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and resuming nuclear testing. (The last US nuclear test was on 23 September 1992). In particular, some key Administration officials believe that testing is necessary to develop a ‘new generation’ of nuclear weapons, including low-yield, ‘bunkerbusting’, earth-penetrating weapons specifically designed to destroy very hard and deeply buried targets (such as underground command and control centres and leadership bunkers).

#### Alt causes to drug trade – Peru and Colombia FTAs

WOLA No date (Washington Office on Latin America, No date given, but in or after 2006 and before the ratification of the two treaties, “Peru and Colombia FTAs Projected to Increase Drug Trafficking, Violence and Instability in the Andes,” <http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF7E37.pdf>, alp)

The Peru and Colombia FTAs Agriculture Provisions Will Devastate Millions of Peru and Colombia’s Small Farmers: Nearly one third of Peru’s population1 and over twenty percent of Colombian workers2 depend on agriculture for their livelihood. The Peru and Colombia “Free Trade Agreements” (FTAs) require those nations to cut tariffs on many basic agricultural goods, opening up their markets to imports of the same commodities from subsidized U.S. agribusiness. CONVEAGRO, a major Peruvian farmers group estimates that approximately 1.7 million Peruvian families will be immediately affected by these provisions.3 In Colombia, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs conducted a study of the effects of liberalization on nine primary agricultural products and found that full liberalization would lead to a 35 per cent decrease in employment.4 Experts Warn that the Colombia and Peru FTAs Will Lead to Increased Drug Production and Violence: Colombia and Peru are the top two producers of cocaine in the world, with Colombian cocaine representing two-thirds of the world’s supply.5 The Washington Post editorial board warned in February 2006 that the “rural dislocation that would follow from ending all protection for Colombian farmers could undermine the government’s efforts to pacify the countryside. If farmers can’t grow rice, they are more likely to grow coca.”6 As Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz noted, the upheaval that such agreements will have on rural livelihoods is a self-defeating course that will mean “there will be more violence and the U.S. will have to spend more on coca eradication.”7 In the words of Archbishop Pedro Barreto, the President of the Episcopal Commission for Social Action of the Catholic Church in Peru, “We are certain that the trade agreement will increase the cultivation of coca, which brings along with it a series of negative consequences including drug trafficking, terrorism and violence.”8 Increased Drug Production is Linked to Past NAFTA-style Agricultural Trade Policies on Which the Peru and Colombia FTAs are Based: We do not need to rely on experts’ opinions regarding how the proposed FTAs will lead to increases in drug production. Unfortunately, there is a factual record demonstrating the phenomena. After NAFTA drove down commodity prices in Mexico and eventually 1.3 million Mexican campesinos were driven out of the business of growing corn and beans, many Mexican farmers turned to illegal drugs to compensate for lost income. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office reports that in NAFTA’s first decade, marijuana seizures doubled at the U.S.-Mexico border.9 Peru and Colombia’s neighbor Bolivia provides another stark example; after Bolivia underwent significant trade liberalization in the 1980s, many poor farmers were unable to earn sufficient income from legal crops and cocaine production rose 13 percent each year for the first three years of this policy.10 Peru experienced a similar trend when the liberalization of the coffee market depressed prices, with the result that “[peasant farmers] started to re-activate their abandoned coca fields and coca cultivation again rose in Peru.”11 The Colombia FTA Could Exacerbate Colombia’s Ongoing Civil Conflict: Colombia remains embroiled in a war between left-leaning guerillas, right-wing paramilitaries and the government. Colombia is wracked with some of the worst violence in the world: in 2005 alone there were over 17,331 homicides.12 Given the rural displacement and further impoverishment the Colombia FTA is projected to cause, the Colombian Ministry of Agriculture concluded that the FTA would give small farmers little choice but “migration to the cities or other countries (especially the United States), working in drug cultivation zones, or affiliating with illegal armed groups.”

#### Drug policy can’t solve:

#### 1) Drug trade’s resilient

Youngers and Rosin 4 (Coletta A., and Eileen, leading expert on international drug control policy in Latin America, independent consultant with the International Drug Policy Consortium, MA from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, staff at the Washington Office on Latin America, AND financial manager at the Amazon Conservation Association, Washington Office on Latin America special report, November 2004, “Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy,” <http://www.umass.edu/legal/Benavides/Fall2005/397G/Readings%20Legal%20397%20G/10%20WOLA.pdf>, alp)

U.S. ofﬁcials routinely assert that international counterdrug programs are successful. Short-term tactical successes are indeed evident—coca crops are eradicated, trafﬁckers are arrested, and shipments are intercepted. Nonetheless, total coca production has remained remarkably steady and there is no evidence demonstrating a signiﬁcant reduction in the supply of illicit drugs on U.S. city streets. To the contrary— the stability of illicit drugs’ price and purity levels points to their continued accessibility. The drug trade is more like a balloon than a battleﬁeld—when one part of a balloon is squeezed, its contents are displaced to another. Similarly, when coca production is suppressed in one area, it quickly pops up somewhere else, disregarding national borders. Arrested drug lords are quickly replaced by others who move up the ranks; dismantled cartels are replaced by smaller, leaner operations that are harder to detect and deter. When drug-trafﬁcking routes are disrupted by intensive interdiction campaigns, they are simply shifted elsewhere. Andean coca cultivation, as depicted by the State Department’s own annual estimates, is remarkable for its stability at around 200,000 hectares per year (see chart on page 3). While the share of crops raised in each coca-producing country has ﬂuctuated, the total land area under cultivation each year has not varied dramatically.4 Moreover, according to U.S. government statistics, the average yield of coca leaves per hectare has risen over time, so that even apparent declines in cultivated land area may not translate into less coca available for processing into cocaine.5 In announcing the U.S. government ﬁgures for 2003 coca production, U.S. ofﬁcials all but declared victory. A sharp drop in Andean region coca cultivation, from 223,700 hectares in 2001 to 173,450 hectares in 2003, was attributed to a signiﬁcant reduction of Colombia’s coca crop and a smaller reduction in Peru.6 While U.S. ofﬁcials took the drop as a sign of success, the reduction represents only a 5 percent decrease, if measured from 1999 instead of the 2001 high point.7 Evidence is already mounting of a shift in coca production within Colombia to new areas, as farmers ﬂee massive fumigation campaigns, and coca production in Bolivia is again on the rise.

#### 2) Counter-drug policies cause fragmentation – increases violence

Youngers and Rosin 4 (Coletta A., and Eileen, leading expert on international drug control policy in Latin America, independent consultant with the International Drug Policy Consortium, MA from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, staff at the Washington Office on Latin America, AND financial manager at the Amazon Conservation Association, Washington Office on Latin America special report, November 2004, “Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy,” <http://www.umass.edu/legal/Benavides/Fall2005/397G/Readings%20Legal%20397%20G/10%20WOLA.pdf>, alp)

A similar phenomenon happens with arrests of trafﬁckers. Removing one set of international drug dealers has often simply cleared the way for rivals and new entrants to the drug trade, rather than reducing the size of the drug market. Smashing the large Mexican and Colombian cartels led to the formation of groups that are smaller and harder to detect. Larger and more frequent drug seizures, often offered as evidence of policy success, are in fact inherently ambiguous indicators. They may instead reﬂect increased drug production and trafﬁcking, as trafﬁckers seek to compensate for their anticipated losses.

#### Drug trade declining

WSJ 6/28 (Wall Street Journal, “Mexico Sees Decline in Drug-Related Killings”, June 28th, 2013, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324328204578573760968965312.html>)

Drug-related killings that turned parts of Mexico into the bloodiest spots on the globe appear to have decreased in recent months - a welcome trend in a nation exhausted by years of violence associated with organized crime, even if the reasons behind it are hard to pin down. The bloodshed is still alarmingly high, as the northern border and even the Acapulco beach resort continue to suffer from cartel turf wars. In his first six months in office, around 6,300 people died in killings seen as linked to organized crime. But that is a drop of about 18% compared with an estimated 7,700 in the previous six months. A separate study by a nonprofit group, the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness, used all reported murders, not just those classified as organized crime-related. It then seasonally adjusted the murder rates - since summer months tend to see a spike - and came up with a less-pronounced drop of 6% to around 10,000 murders, compared with about 10,600 in the six months before Mr. Peña Nieto took office. The study's lead author, Alejandro Hope, a former government intelligence official, said the seasonally adjusted decline seems to have flattened out in recent months, suggesting further gains may be hard to come by. "The situation is improving at a very slow rate," said Mr. Hope. "My nightmare scenario is that we get used to 20,000 or 25,000 people getting killed every year."

**Drug trade inevitable**

**Scotsman 7** (12/13, War on drugs' can never be won, lexis, AG)

In the western world, we have been "fighting" what is - laughably? - called the "war on drugs" for some 40 years now, and the results are plain to see. Failure, utter failure. In comparison with the "war on drugs", the Iraq war seems a resounding success. The number of drug-users is probably higher than ever before - it was recently claimed that there are nine million of them in the United Kingdom, the majority, admittedly, restricting themselves to the so-called "soft drugs". Meanwhile, the profits are so huge that the drugs barons laugh all the way to their offshore bank deposits. Of course, the police and the law win occasional skirmishes. Consignments of drugs with a "street-value" put at hundreds of thousands, sometimes even millions, of pounds are seized. Dealers go to prison (where they find a new and every bit as profitable market). Even "Godfathers" may be arrested, charged and locked up, and their identifiable assets seized. But nobody can pretend that this really makes much difference. The profits of the drugs trade are so huge that there are always new entrepreneurs eager to step in and supply any temporary gap in the market. Nobody knows just how big that market is. Any estimates offered are little better than guesses. Likewise, nobody knows to what extent these profits are recycled into apparently legitimate businesses. What we can, sadly, be sure of is that, as a result of the demand for drugs, supply is never likely to dry up. The "war on drugs" will never be won.

**Conspiracies, corruption, and counter-surveillance by Mexican smuggling organizations make it difficult to detect operations**

**U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement '12** ("Border Security Threats to the Homeland: DHS' Response to Innovative Tactics and Techniques" Homeland Security Department Documents and Publications 6/19/2012, Lexis 6/19/2012)

Internal conspiracies and corruption are another significant vulnerability seen by HSI in its investigations of smuggling organizations at commercial airports and other U.S. ports of entry. In many of its investigations, HSI sees how these internal conspiracies utilize various employees from multiple companies and positions, including managers and supervisors. Employees utilize innumerable diversionary tactics to smuggle contraband around CBP examination. Finally, Mexican smuggling organizations routinely utilize counter-surveillance methods in an attempt to adjust their methods of operation based on U.S. law enforcement efforts. "Spotters," as they are known, operate almost exclusively in Mexico, rarely entering the United States where they can be detained for questioning or arrest. In addition, modern cellular telephone and radio communication technology make detection even more difficult, as organizations can use them to adjust their modes of operation in order to be more successful.

# 2NC

### 2NC – Overview (China econ) (0:20)

#### The CCP has meticulously planned Chinese growth to account for slowdowns, but they require exports to buttress their economy – declining demand in the US and Europe forces them to Latin America – that’s Holland.

#### 

#### Exports are key to the economy – downturn collapses the CCP’s hold on power which causes nuclear lashout and global draw-in. That outweighs on magnitude. CCP irrationality and the perceptive nature of the internal link mean we win timeframe: you can only die once.

#### Independently, they conceded the economy impact in the Buzan and Foot ev – Chinese slowdown collapses global growth which turns the case:

### 2NC – Turns narcotrafficking

#### Chinese investment turns and solves narcotrafficking

Ellis 12– Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (R. Evan, “The United States, Latin America, and China: A “Triangular Relationship”?”, Inter-American Dialogue, May, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf)//VP>

On the positive side, China’s donation of goods to countries and its sale of goods at relatively low prices have contributed to the ability of governments in the region to assert control over national territory and meet such challenges as narcotrafficking**.** The use of Chinese K-8 aircraft, purchased by Bolivia from the PRC, is one example.The donation of trucks and buses to the Bolivian armed forces and non-lethal gear to the Jamaica Defense Force are other such examples.15

### 2NC – Link overview (0:55)

#### Latin American imports are finite and carefully calibrated to play to the strengths of a variety of trade partners. The aff swings the pendulum away from China, decreasing their exports to Latin America and hurting their economy – that’s Holland.

#### Their “not zero sum” arguments don’t assume the nuance of the link – we agree that trade and relations are not zero sum, but the aff is indicative of US re-entrenchment in the region, overturning decades of neglect in a show of benevolence to get rid of Latin America’s drug scourge. The perceived olive branch extended to Venezuela, empirically an enemy, sways political opinion in Latin America by signaling the US can engage Latin America without imperialism or manipulation. Proximity supercharges the link

Ben Ami 13 (Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace “Is the US Losing Latin America?” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami)

Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.

#### Empirics prove that trade credibility, not net trade, is the determining factor in market choices – Latin America will gravitate towards the US regardless of actual market competition

Ellis 2011(R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60\_85-91\_Ellis.pdf)//VP

It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

### 2NC – AT: Drugs

#### The aff doesn’t solve the drug trade – cutting off one distribution point isn’t sufficient. Narcotraffickers will just innovate or change their routes – empirics prove in-transit policies are ineffective. FTAs with Colombia and Peru cut off economic opportunity for small farmers which incentivized production – if supply and demand are inevitable, cartels will find a way to unite them – that’s WOLA and Youngers.

#### Mexico proves – increased security at the US-Mexico border, container scanning, and drug dogs still didn’t stem the tide – just because Venezuela’s a key hub for trafficking, doesn’t mean containment there will be any more effective than it has been anywhere else.

### 2NC – AT: Navy (generic)

**No impact to naval power—that’s Rhodes—**

**a) No credibility—motivated aggressors ignore naval capabilities—they think they’ve found ways to circumvent advantages**

**b) Prefer our evidence**

**1) Empirics—our evidence analyzes the intentions of adversaries**

**B) It says even if they are right, any conflict they deter is so small that current capabilities are sufficient**

**C) Theirs doesn’t assume land and airpower—they have increased flexibility that fills in and solves**

[NOTE: Also in 1nc UQ]

**D) Even if there will be conflicts, none of them will be naval**

**Goure 10** (Daniel Goure. PhD in IR, BA in government, VP of the Lexington Institute, member of the Department of Defense Transition Team, former director of Strategic Competitiveness for the Secretary of State, senior analyst on national security and defense issues with the Center for Naval Analyses. “Can the Case be Made for Naval Power?” 2 July 2010. Lexington Institute. http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171)

More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administration’s current plan is to rely on sea-based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed. The sea ways, sometimes called the global commons, are predominantly free of dangers. The exception to this is the chronic but relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively unimportant in today’s world.

**E) If their evidence doesn’t assume anti-access weapons they lose**

**World Tribune 10** - Gates hints China's anti-ship threat may render carriers obsolete, 4-29, http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/ea\_china0431\_05\_19.asp

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates last week said in a speech that the U.S. Navy is facing asymmetric warfare threats and questioned whether naval forces that are very expensive should be pared back. Gates told the Navy League on May 3 that U.S. enemies are “investing in weapons designed to neutralize U.S. advantages, to deny our military freedom of action while potentially threatening America's primary means of projecting power: our bases, sea and air assets, and the networks that support them.” “We know other nations are working on asymmetric ways to thwart the reach and striking power of the U.S. battle fleet,” he said. At the lower end of the threat spectrum is the Lebanese terrorist group Hizbullah that has used anti-ship missiles against the Israeli navy during the 2006 summer war. Iran also is “combining ballistic and cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, mines, and swarming speedboats in order to challenge our naval power in that region,” he said. The higher end of what Gates called the “access-denial spectrum” is the effort to erode what has been a virtual monopoly by the United States on precision guided weapons. These include “long-range, accurate anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially strike from over the horizon,” he said, without mentioning that the main developer of these weapons is China. “This is a particular concern with aircraft carriers and other large, multibillion-dollar blue-water surface combatants, where, for example, a Ford-class carrier plus its full complement of the latest aircraft would represent potentially a $15 (billion) to $20 billion set of hardware at risk,” Gates said. Additionally sophisticated underwater threats are growing, including the use of sonar-evading stealth submarines that could “end the operational sanctuary our Navy has enjoyed in the Western Pacific for the better part of six decades,” Gates said. Gates said budget constraints are forcing the military to reduce its efforts to maintain an 11 aircraft carrier strike group.

**Ground forces are key—naval power empirically fails**

**Guardiano 9** (John, Marine – Iraq and Worker – Army’s Future Combat Systems, “Air Power Alone Cannot Win Wars”, New Majority, 8-12, <http://www.newmajority.com/air-power-alone-cannot-win-wars>)

One of the great lessons of recent military history is that wars cannot be won through air power alone; you need boots on the ground. Recall, for instance, the exaggerated claims of “shock and awe” prior to the 2003 liberation of Iraq. Exponents of air power had assured us that the decisive exercise of military power, principally through aerial bombardment, could paralyze the enemy, destroy his will to fight, and render him impotent. In fact, it was only after U.S. soldiers and Marines engaged the enemy in close combat that Iraqi government and Fedayeen forces surrendered and Iraq was liberated. Even then it took additional close combat over several years ─ in Fallujah, Mosul, Najaf, Baghdad, and elsewhere ─ before the military component of the Iraq War was truly won. And Iraq is hardly the only example that proves the crucial necessity of ground forces in modern-day conflicts. In Afghanistan, for instance, U.S. Marines are today engaging the enemy in close-quarters combat to protect the Afghan citizenry. Jets and air ordinance can’t do this; only soldiers and Marines can. The Israelis, too, have learned the hard way that ground forces are integral to victory. Indeed, their 2006 battle against Hezbollah made heavy use of air, naval, and rocket attacks, but **to little avail.** Israeli tanks, moreover, were destroyed by Hezbollah guerillas, who made effective use of advanced technology to fight the powerful Israeli military to a standstill. The lesson then and now is clear: In significant respects, air power is irrelevant to modern-day conflicts. Military success today requires small-scale infantry units who can fight lethally and with precision in populated areas filled with civilian non-combatants. And our infantry units had better be equipped with the latest and greatest technology: because our enemies certainly are, thanks to the internet, eBay, and other virtual bazaars. Yet, old habits die hard; the siren song of air power ─ the false allure of “shock and awe” ─ lives on. Its latest manifestation occurred last week in the Wall Street Journal, where retired Air Force General Chuck Wald argues that an American military “bombing campaign would set back Iranian nuclear development…”

**The impact is empirically denied and their evidence reflects a flawed understanding of how to measure the aggregate of US naval power**

**Hoffman, 08** [Frank G. Hoffman, Senior Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21st Century, http://www.cnas.org/node/529

One of the most important national security challenges facing the next president of the United States will be preserving America’s maritime power. The U.S. Navy has been cut in half since the 1980s, shrinking steadily from 594 to today’s 280 ships. The fleet size has been cut by 60 ships during the Bush administration alone, despite significantly increased Pentagon budgets. Several naval analysts and commentators, including the observant Robert Kaplan, have argued that America’s present naval fleet constitutes an “elegant decline” or outright neglect. A former Reagan administration naval official contends that our current maritime policy and investment levels are “verging towards unilateral naval disarmament.” This is something of an overstatement. The American naval fleet is still substantially larger than any other, and has unmatched global reach and endurance. The U.S. Navy’s aggregate tonnage is **the equivalent of the next 17 international** navies, of which 14 are U.S. allies, and our power projection capabilities retain a 4:1 advantage in missiles. Looking simply at overall **naval ship totals may not be the most accurate measure of naval power**, but it is an historical standard of measurement. By that criterion, the U.S. Navy has not been this size since World War I, when Britain’s Royal Navy was the guarantor of the global commons.

**Debt is a massive alt cause**

**Bencivenga, 10** [Jim Bencivenga is a former teacher and Monitor staffer, “Will US naval power sink?”http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/1025/Will-US-naval-power-sink,

That's a mistake, because our commitment to naval power today will affect America's standing in the world – and its ability to contain an increasingly aggressive China – for the next half century. Yet this commitment is on shaky ground given the out-of-control national debt. And the ruling party has few hands on deck to meet this national challenge.

One gauge of a great power's military stature is the readiness of its fleet versus that of its likely foes.

Deterring an aggressive China

According to a 2009 Pentagon report, China has an estimated 260 naval vessels, all concentrated in East Asia. The United States has 288 battle-force ships with 11 carrier task forces and dozens of nuclear submarines as the crown jewels. The US fleet patrols worldwide. China's fleet has been concentrated in its home waters, but its range is rapidly extending to as far as the Middle East.

"China seeks domination of the South China Sea to be the dominant power in much of the Eastern Hemisphere," defense expert Robert D. Kaplan has written. As Mr. Kaplan notes, the South China Sea is a vital route for much of Asia's commercial traffic and energy needs. The US and other nations consider it an international passageway. China calls it a "core interest."

To maintain naval strength, reduce debt

To keep the US blue-water fleet the best in the world costs billions. A debtor nation eventually cuts defense spending, and big-ticket items like new ships are the first to go.

That is why maritime defense is the sleeper issue of these elections. The party that reduces national debt can maintain naval strength. The party that doesn't allows US naval prominence to sink.

**Institutional alt causes outweigh**

**Cropsey 10** - Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC He served as Naval Officer from 1985 to 2004 and as deputy senior under secretary of the Navy in the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. Bush. (Seth, “The US Navy in Distress,” Strategic Analysis Vol. 34 No. 1, January 2010, pgs 35-45, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Cropsey\_US\_Navy\_In\_Distress.pdf)//aberg

In February 2009, the Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser *U.S.S. Port Royal* ran aground about a half mile south of the Honolulu airport. The Navy’s investigation found that the ship’s navigational gear was broken and that the ship’s fathometer wasn’t functioning. In simple terms the bridge didn’t know where the ship was. The investigation subsequently discovered that the commanding officer was exhausted, sleep-deprived, and that sailors who were nominally assigned to stand watch against such incidents were assigned elsewhere in the ship to cover manning shortages. Two months later the Navy’s iron-willed Board of Inspection and Survey determined that problems with corrosion, steering, surface ships’ firefighting systems, and anchoring were widespread throughout the Navy. Asked by *Defense News* to comment on these findings five former commanding officers agreed that smaller crews, reduced budgets, and fewer real-life training opportunities for over-worked crews were important causes for this catalogue of affliction. It’s hardly a surprise. The Navy reported last year that 11,300 sailors were supporting ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reduced budgets, efforts to save money by cutting the size of crews, schemes to take up the slack with shore services, and all manner of ‘labor-saving’ devices parallel and reflect the Navy’s increasingly distressed fortunes since the end of the Cold War. The US Navy has not been as small as it is today since the administration of William Howard Taft when the Royal Navy filled the international role that America’s naval forces eventually inherited and currently possess. As suggested by the past two decades of declining navy procurement, the rising cost of ships, hints from the Pentagon’s Quadrennial Review now underway that previous goals for fleet size are open to question, and the public’s focus on the nation’s land wars in the Middle East, chances are that US naval shrinkage will continue. The likelihood of a much diminished navy coincides in time with every current prediction of large global strategic change in the foreseeable future. Among National Intelligence Council estimates, Joint Operating Environment forecasts, the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment’s studies, the UK Defence Ministry’s Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre as well as similar predictive efforts undertaken by French and German national security experts, there is a general consensus. Proliferation, resource scarcity, environmental change, the emergence of new international power centres including non-state actors, significant changes in relative US power, failed states, and demographic change point to an increasingly unstable future and challenging international strategic environment. The common denominator in managing these problems is maritime power: force that can be applied to the shore from the sea, used to protect against missile-borne as well as stealthier ocean-borne Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), marshaled to alleviate the causes of massive immigration, and displayed to reassure allies and dissuade enemies. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have sucked the oxygen out of any serious effort to understand the connection between the large changes that strategic planners see in the future, Americans’ expectations that they will retain their ability to wield global influence, the Navy’s role in maintaining such influence, and the US fleet’s slow evanescence. No attempt to connect fleet shape and size to the unfolding strategic environment exists as a referent for public debate. Indeed, civilian and military leadership maintains in the face of growing demand for ships to defend against relatively low threats – like piracy – as well as very dangerous ones – like the possibility of smuggled WMD reaching our shores – that ‘capability’ rather than number of ships is key to accurately measuring our naval power. With very few exceptions political leaders in both parties do not ask fundamental questions. What role does naval power have in preserving America’s position as the world’s great power in the middle of a fluid and troubling strategic environment? Even with Congress and administration support how can the nation’s current maritime strategy achieve its own goals, to say nothing of the global objectives that Theodore Roosevelt saw so clearly? The cooperative arrangements with foreign navies envisioned by the Navy’s current maritime strategy may perhaps moderate problems of failing states and terror. But is this enough to manage other challenges? Is the Navy’s current organization capable of addressing both conventional and asymmetric threats? Can today’s highly structured and inflexible system for designing and building ships adapt quickly and cost-effectively to changes in the strategic environment? What, for example, do globalization, the growing dependence of the United States on sea-borne transit for strategic resources and minerals, and the likelihood of more dislocations such as continue from Somali piracy mean for the future of US national security?

### 2NC – AT: China (war generic)

#### No US-China war:

#### a) China prefers soft power and can’t compete militarily with us – internal problems force them to look inwards which discourages warmongering. Globalization allows peaceful dispute resolution – that’s Cliff.

#### b) Economic interdependence outweighs incentives for conflict because exports to Western nations are 60% of their economy – CCP leaders suppress warmongering to keep progress on track. MAD and nuclear deterrence check escalation. This proves the China DA is the only internal link to conflict because economic collapse cultivates state instability and internal conflict which destroys CCP rationality and results in loose nukes.

#### China won’t be deliberately aggressive:

#### a) The PLA sucks

Moss 2/10 (Trefor, Hong-Kong based journalist, The Diplomat: Asia-Pacific, February 10, 2013, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War,” <http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/>, alp)

Note – Shinzo Abe is the current prime minister of Japan

3. Question marks over the PLA’s operational effectiveness. The People’s Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, but there are concerns about how effective it would prove if pressed into combat today – not least within China’s own military hierarchy. New Central Military Commission Vice-Chairman Xu Qiliang recently told the PLA Daily that too many PLA exercises are merely for show, and that new elite units had to be formed if China wanted to protect its interests. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping has also called on the PLA to improve its readiness for “real combat.” Other weaknesses within the PLA, such as endemic corruption, would similarly undermine the leadership’s confidence in committing it to a risky war with a peer adversary.

#### b) New Chinese leadership

Moss 2/10 (Trefor, Hong-Kong based journalist, The Diplomat: Asia-Pacific, February 10, 2013, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War,” <http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/>, alp)

Note – Shinzo Abe is the current prime minister of Japan

4. Unsettled politics. China’s civil and military leaderships remain in a state of flux, with the handover initiated in November not yet complete. As the new leaders find their feet and jockey for position amongst themselves, they will want to avoid big foreign-policy distractions – war with Japan and possibly the U.S. being the biggest of them all. 5. The unknown quantity of U.S. intervention. China has its hawks, such as Dai Xu, who think that the U.S. would never intervene in an Asian conflict on behalf of Japan or any other regional ally. But this view is far too casual. U.S. involvement is a real enough possibility to give China pause, should the chances of conflict increase.

#### c) Benign hegemony and empirics

Moss 2/10 (Trefor, Hong-Kong based journalist, The Diplomat: Asia-Pacific, February 10, 2013, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War,” <http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/>, alp)

Note – Shinzo Abe is the current prime minister of Japan

6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships. There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before). 7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners. Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch. In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

### 2NC – AT: Russia

#### No Russian aggression – Ball indicates ICBMs are detargeted, reducing the possibility of miscalculation and taking away triggers for escalation. PNTR disputes prove Russia will always back down after aggression and MAD checks deliberate conflict.

**Russia’s too weak to pursue expansionism**

**Bandow** 3 - 15 - **10** [Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, "Give Peace a Chance," The National Interest,

http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11573]

First, Moscow poses no threat to America. No doubt, Vladimir Putin's Russia has taken a nasty authoritarian turn. But it is a **declining power with a weakened military and shrinking population.** Washington once feared the well-provisioned Soviet military. Today Moscow is buying ships from France.

Russia is not even to blame for the Georgian war. The Putin government may have provoked conflict with Georgia, but it did not force the Saakashvili government to fire the first shot. The war looks similar to President George H. W. Bush's invasion of Panama: a dubious venture, but one foolishly invited by an irresponsible local ruler.

Even assuming blatant aggression, Georgia, a border state that was once part of Imperial Russia as well as the Soviet Union, is a matter of peculiar geopolitical interest in Moscow. The **Baltic States are not** such obvious **targets of Russia's coercive attention.**

Moreover, the Russia-Georgia **war basically exhausted Russian offensive capabilities.** Moscow retains a superpower's nuclear arsenal, but little else. Today the Kremlin can barely rough up Tbilisi. Even Ukraine would not be easy for Moscow to swallow. The European Union has three times the population and ten times the GDP of Russia.

The United States has an even greater advantage. **Moscow isn't going to choose war with America**. Why should Washington choose war with Russia?

**Russia won’t be aggressive towards the US  
Lieber 8** – professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown (Robert, Falling Upwards, World Affairs, Summer, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/2008%20-%20Summer/full-Lieber.html, AG)

Farther East, and despite its economic recovery and the restoration of central power under Putin, Russia remains overwhelmingly dependent on the current boom in energy and commodity prices—and correspondingly vulnerable in the event of their decline. The country suffers from pervasive corruption, with a ranking from Transparency International that puts it at 121 among 163 countries in this category. Its population, already less than half that of the U.S. and plagued with alcoholism, chronic violence, a decrepit health-care system, and a male life expectancy of fewer than 60 years of age (lower than that of Bangladesh), shrinks by some half a million people per year. And its army, while bidding for attention and resources, remains weak and in disarray. As The Economist recently summarized Putin’s Russia, it has become one of the most “criminalized, corrupt and bureaucratized countries in the world.” True, the Putin regime plays to its domestic base with strident nationalism and xenophobia. In doing so, it has actively opposed and occasionally subverted American policies on some issues while providing a degree of cooperation on others. Instances of the former include opposition to NATO enlargement and to the stationing of anti-missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, the use of oil and gas resources as leverage against neighboring countries, overt and covert pressure against former Soviet Republics, and arms sales to Syria and Iran. Yet Moscow grudgingly collaborates where it has shared concerns, as with North Korea and combating terrorism. Russia presents a problem for the United States, but its erratic behavior, its priorities at home, and its own internal decline put it well short of being a major power challenger.

**Multiple factors check Russia war**

**VOA News 7** (3/27, Experts Do Not Foresee US Conflict with Russia, http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-03-27-voa75.cfm, AG)

Armed conflict between the United States and Russia is neither inevitable nor likely. Indeed, Mikhail Delyagin, an adviser to former Russian Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov, says a struggle with the West in general it is not in the interests of Russian elites. He spoke through an interpreter. "Representatives of the ruling groups have their bank accounts in the West. And the second point is to understand that the Russian army does not exist and the Russian economy is extremely weak. Our Black Sea fleet is not even at the level of the forces of Bulgaria and Romania," he said. One of the panel members at the Hudson Institute conference, Moscow political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky, says Russia and the United States, dominant powers of the 20th Century, now need to cooperate with one another. "In the 21st century, both the West and Russia are in a much more vulnerable position. We are both challenged by Islamic radicalism, and then, maybe more long term and less obvious, but maybe more dangerous -- the potential challenge of a rising China," he said. Russian journalist Evgeny Kiselyev agrees that the United States and Russia have common interests.

### 2NC (N)Overview

#### Venezuela will reject QPQ’s—that’s El Universal and Shifter

#### A) Zero tolerance policy—Venezuela refuses to be bullied by the US—they won’t accept “any pressures”

#### B) Statements—Maduro’s announced termination of all bilateral relations with the US—prefer official statements over blind optimism—reject any evidence that doesn’t assume recent developments

#### C) Framing issue—Maduro has staked his credibility on Anti-Americanism—Maduro must refuse the plan no matter how appealing it is to maintain power

#### Venezuela says no

#### A. US involvement against the Venezuelan government

Latina 12-23

(BERNAMA-NNN-PRENSA, Maduro Says US Waging Economic War Against Venezuela, Dec 23, 2013, <http://www.bernama.com.my/bernama/v7/wn/newsworld.php?id=1003124>, JZG)

CARACAS, Dec 23 (BERNAMA-NNN-PRENSA LATINA) -- Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has accused the United States of waging economic war against his country and has described President Barack Obama's policy as bad, if he does not know about it and worse if he does.¶ In an interview with journalist Roberto Malaver from the Ultimas Noticias newspaper, Maduro said that the economic war against Venezuela was decided in the White House.¶ That, he said, was part of the power elite in the United States, who felt that the time to destroy the Bolivarian revolution had arrived.¶ Maduro recalled he had some names. "They were people from the Treasury Department and the Department of State, and there was a person at the meeting who warned Venezuela," he said.¶ Maduro said the government economic offensive to counter that war by the opposition in and out of the country gave more strength to government supporters.¶ On the state of the opposition and the recent peace talks held with mayors and governors of the Right, Maduro considered that the leaders of these opposing forces "have put their followers at a dead end."¶ He added that this dialogue will be followed by work actions, in which there will be irreconcilable points as "those who believe in capitalism will continue to believe in it. We, who believe in socialism, we will continue to believe in socialism as a human liberating expression", he said.

#### B. Deep ingrained hatred of the US

Mallett-Outtrim 12-25

(Ryan, Venezuelan General Deterrence: New Axis of Evil or Third World Liberation?, December 25th 2013, <http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/10257>, JZG)

Venezuela-U.S. Relations; military¶ Over the last decade general deterrence imperatives have played a major role in shaping Venezuelan foreign policy. This is largely a response to US imperialism. After decades of aggression against its southern neighbours, Washington is today viewed by the Venezuelan state as a prime security threat. The threat however, is not reciprocal despite efforts to securitise Venezuela as a belligerent in US discourse. However, even after years of modernising its armed forces, the Venezuelan military plays an almost insignificant role in the country's general deterrence strategy, and are of a negligible threat to Washington. Instead of relying on military deterrence, Venezuela has instead sought to soft balance the US through the creation of international cooperative institutions. However, these institutions are more than just conventional alliances, and merely disregarding them as populist appeals is simplistic. Yet while the revolutionary character of Venezuelan foreign policy remains unclear, it is evident that the country's deterrence policy is not only a bulwark against US imperialism in Latin America, but is also ideologically incoherent with neoliberalism.¶ For over a decade, the presence of an overwhelmingly powerful regional antagonist has played an important role in shaping Venezuelan foreign policy, with the 2002 coup acting as a watershed moment in the securitisation of the US in Venezuelan discourse. When former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez was temporarily ousted from his elected office that year, Hakim (2006, p 48) concedes that Washington's “initial enthusiasm” for the armed insurrection raised questions about US “commitment to democracy”. Of course, initial enthusiasm is an understatement. As Harvey (2003 p 8) puts it, Washington was gripped with “euphoria” when it was evident that “a businessman” had seized power. Although it’s unclear whether or not the US was an “organizing [sic] force” behind the coup (as Chavez suggested), it's “clear is that the U.S.[sic] had prior knowledge that a coup was in the works and quickly recognized[sic] interim President Luis Carmona Estanga when he took power” (Smilde, 2013). Indeed, Carmona was widely viewed in Washington as someone who would create “the basis for solid future development” (Harvey, 2003 p 8). However, given the historic position of most of Latin America in the world economy, perhaps development isn't the right term. Since the 16th Century, the continent's economic underdevelopment has been the “outcome of a particular series of relationships to... [the] international system” (Bodenheimer, 1971, p 330). Bodenheimer (1971, pp 331-332) postulates that Latin American underdevelopment can be explained in the framework of dependency theory, whereby the “growth in the dependent nations occurs as a reflex of the expansion of the dominant nations, and is geared towards the needs of the dominant economies”. Like European colonial powers in the past, during the last century US “development” and Latin American “underdevelopment” were “structurally linked...two outcomes of the same historical process: the global expansion of capitalism” (Bodenheimer, 1971, p 334). These two historic factors are crucial to understanding contemporary Venezuelan-US relations.¶ However, despite the historic importance of the region to US development, Washington's unfocused, and at times lethargic approach to Latin America in the new century has not only contributed to the persistence of glum relations with Caracas; it has also reinforced a growing perception in the region that the US is unreliable. Following September 11, 2001, US interest in Latin America became “sporadic and narrowly targeted” (Hakim, 2006, p 39). Throughout the first half of the decade, US-Latin American relations “seriously deteriorated” and support for US policy diminished notably (Hakim, 2006, p 39). By the decade's mid-point, few “Latin Americans, in or out of government, consider[ed] the United States to be a dependable partner” (Hakim, 2006, p 39). These perceptions are not without both contemporary and historic justification. Indeed, while the White House “praised...and justified” the 2002 Venezuelan coup (Clement, 2005, p 70), “[m]ost people in Latin America...recalled what the Chileans now ironically refer to as 'their little September 11th of 1973 when the democratically elected socialist, Salvador Allende, was overthrown in a brutal croup by General Augusto Pinochet” (Harvey, 2003 p 8). Over 100,000 Chileans were detained and tortured under Pinochet, and thousands were killed under a regime that enjoyed significant US support (Winn, 2004, pp 18-19). A declassified CIA cable concerning the event states that “[i]t is a firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup”; hence unsurprisingly in 2002 many in Latin America “immediately saw the hand of the CIA” (Harvey, 2003 p 8). Indeed, the overthrow of Allende wasn't the only attempt by the CIA to undermine a Latin American leftist government. Throughout the 1980s, the “American terrorist army, the Contra” massacred thousands of Nicaraguans in their war against the Sandinista government while being “trained, armed and funded by the CIA” (Pilger, 1998, p 26). In such a context, the suspicion levelled at the US isn't entirely unfounded. After all, in leaked diplomatic cables written in late 2006, then-US Ambassador to Venezuela William Brownfield outlined Washington's four point plan to seemingly destabilise the government by “penetrating Chavez's political base,” “dividing Chavismo,” “protecting vital U.S. business” and “isolating Chavez internationally” (Wikileaks, 2012). It seems that old habits die hard.¶ Suspicion towards Washington is now deeply engrained in Venezuelan political tradition. Throughout his presidency, Chavez often accused Washington of plotting against him. His successor, Nicolas Maduro, has likewise alleged that he has been targeted by an assassination plot backed by figures in the US (Robertson, 2013(1)). Crane (2005) quotes Sweig as labelling these accusations as part of a “rhetorical tit for tat” between Caracas and Washington; but there is more to it than such a simplistic conclusion presumes. In Copenhagen-esque terms, “speech acts” play an important role in converting something (anything potentially) into an “existential threat” to a specific “referent object” (McDonald, 2008, p 69); hence securitising it in public discourse. As previously outlined, such discourse is not without material justification. Alternatively, the cynic could label Chavez/Maduro's rhetoric on the US as a mere attempt to manufacture consent, but that would inarguably call Brownfield's credibility into question. It would also require ignoring policy pursued by the US that in conventional security terms would easily constitute as aggression, like its intensive spying on the Venezuelan petroleum industry (Pearson, 2013) and sanctions on the Venezuelan state arms manufacturer CAVIM (Orozco, 2013). Washington's own securitisation in Venezuelan (and arguably Latin American) political discourse is thus the outcome of a long history of aggression that continues today. The notion that the US is at best apathetic towards its southern neighbours, malicious at worst, is indeed very well substantiated by a long line of precedents.¶ In either case, given historical context, it's not at all surprising that in recent years the Venezuelan government has increasingly pursued a policy of deterrence aimed at mitigating perceived state security risks posed by the US. Yet the threat isn't reciprocal. A comprehensive examination of the threat posed by Venezuela to the US is beyond the scope of this essay, though if Venezuela poses any threat to the US, it has been greatly exaggerated in common discourse. Indeed, prior to 2002 Venezuela's contribution to the collapse of bilateral diplomatic cosiness consisted primarily of opposition to the US invasion of Afghanistan and “the increase in internal opposition to Chavez” (Nagel, 2003). These two factors don't seem comparable to Washington's long resume of aggression briefly discussed above, hence necessitating the construction of a new, anti-Chavez securitising discourse in the US. Discourse like that of Noriega, who has accused the Venezuelan government and Hezbollah of collaborating to engage in “asymmetrical warfare against U.S. [sic] security, interests and allies close to the homeland” (Noriega, 2013). Suchlicki (2012) likewise argues that “Venezuela’s growing relations with Iran and Chávez’ support for terrorist groups both in the Americas and the Middle East should worry the U.S [sic]”. Furthermore, according to Berman (2013) Iran's “extensive”, “evolving” operations in the hemisphere could soon pose threats to US “allies in the region and to the U.S.[sic] homeland itself”. Such conceptual constructs may be more amicable to US policy, though none of it is actually taken seriously by Washington, and with good reason. According to a June 2013 US State Department report, Iran isn't supporting any terrorist cells in Latin America, and its influence in the region is “waning” (Goodman, 2013). The fictional Caracas-Tehran-Beirut-terror connection has been therefore deemed of no practical value by US regime elites. On the other hand, the Venezuelan government appears to continue to view the US as a threat. In September 2013, Maduro went as far as cancelling his first trip as president to a session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), claiming former US officials planned on hatching a plot against him, possibly with the knowledge of the White House (Mallett-Outtrim, 2013). Despite the best efforts of the Noriega types to reify the intangible, there is still only one aggressor.

#### C. Oil not key anymore

Foote 12-23

(Andrew, Post-Chavez Venezuela Is Still Hostile to American Oil, Dec 23rd 2013, <http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/12/23/post-chavez-venezuela-is-still-hostile-to-us-oil/>, JZG)

The post-Chavez Venezuela has created a time of political uncertainty under President Maduro. A recent seizure of U.S.-owned oil rigs is a strong sign to U.S. oil companies that their interests are at risk under this new administration.¶ U.S. oil¶ In early November, Venezuelan courts ordered the seizure of U.S.-owned oil rigs, declaring the vital role they play in the development of Venezuela. Grandstanding tactics that were focused on securing physical assets were common under Chavez. Such a bold step is the first move of this type by Maduro, leading many to wonder if this will be more common as his administration matures.¶ Two rigs owned by Superior Energy Services , a company based out of Houston, had its offices seized by members of the Venezuelan state police and National Guard. The Washington Times noted that "their argument was that we were practically sabotaging national production." Ownership of the rigs was assumed by the Venezuela-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela. The two units were hydraulic snubbing units from its facility in Anaco, Venezuela. Snubbing units are essential for drilling operations and are an alternative to wireline and coiled-tubing drilling techniques.¶ This is not the first time under Maduro that a U.S. oil company has had its exploration and production disrupted. In October, ships conducting a seismic survey off the coast of Venezuela were seized. These ships were under contract with Anadarko Petroleum . The ships were flying under a Panamanian flag and were sailing in disputed waters that are claimed by both Guyana and Venezuela. The ships were escorted by the Navy to nearby Margarita Island. The crew was held on-board while an investigation was conducted. Venezuelan authorities claimed the ship was conducting unauthorized geographic surveys in their waters.¶ Under maritime law a nation has the right to safeguard its sovereignty in maritime areas. Anadarko was under concession with the Guyanese government to conduct the surveys. This move could reopen long-standing rivalries between the two nations. In contrast to Venezuela's vast oil wealth, Guyana is a poor nation that is not as capable of enforcing their borders or interests.¶ Venezuela is the fifth-largest exporter of oil to the U.S. While under Chazev, ExxonMobil , Chevron , and ConocoPhillips had their assets nationalized -- operations still run smoothly. Venezuela plays a crucial role in exporting oil to the U.S. In 2012, U.S. companies bought 984,000 barrels of oil per day from state-owned PDVSA.¶ Other foreign oil companies in Venezuela¶ Rosneft has been expanding its presence in Venezuela for some time. For the next five years, Rosneft is planning on investing $13 billion in five projects. Lukoil, Russia's second-largest oil company, will sell shares of its Junin six block in the Orinoco Oil Belt. It is uncertain if Rosneft will buy all of the block in a joint venture with Gazprom Neft or just 8%. Either way, PDSVA will be a key partner in the operations of this block. The map below shows the location of the Orinoco Oil Belt.¶ Source: Upstream Online¶ Rosneft entered into a joint venture with Corporacion Venezolana del Petroleo, a subsidiary of PDVSA, paying $16 billion to pursue E&P operations. The Carabobo-2 field in the Orinoco Oil Belt is expected to produce up to 400,000 barrels per day by 2018. This is in addition to $20 billion invested in Venezuela by Russian state-owned companies.¶ China has also invested $48 billion in E&P since 2008, when the Sino-Venezuelan project Sinovensa -- a joint venture between PDVSA and China National Petroleum -- was formed. Many of its operations are in the Junin 6 block. Sinopec has signaled continued interest in oil speculation with a commitment to invest $14 billion in the Junin 1 field, which is expected to produce 200,000 barrels per day of oil. Development of the Junin 10 block is also anticipated to produce 220,000 barrels per day for an investment of $14 billion.¶ China's investments in Venezuela have extended to the further development of facilities that will ensure oil exports. Recently, Export-Import Bank of China agreed to loan state-owned Venezuelan petrochemicals company Pequiven $390 million for a new port. This is in addition to $40 billion already loaned by China for other projects. The increasingly uncertain supply of oil from Iran has made the development of E&P in Venezuela essential for Chinese growth.¶ Post-Chavez Venezuela¶ Chavez was critical of US FDI and openly courted foreign investors from China and Russia. Many of Rosneft and Sinopec's deals were the result of growing ties between Chavez and Russia and China. The increased presence of these two nations poses a growing risk to U.S. companies and exports to U.S. markets. ¶ When Maduro took office, he wanted to open Venezuela up to more FDI in an attempt to offset the perception that Chavez had perpetrated. The recent problems that Superior Energy and Anadarko have experienced are more characteristic of previous regimes' strong-arm tactics and contrary to the purported direction Maduro is attempting to take. Will Venezuela revert to an older bias against America?¶ Investors should take into account that relations between China and Russia are stronger with Venezuela than with the U.S. The strong presence of Sinopec and Rosneft would create a formidable market hedge in crude oil pricing. This could inflate the value of the commodity, creating a bubble based on export bias. The unpredictability of Maduro could further complicate export pricing for U.S. markets.

#### D) Hardline senate and Power’s comments

**Lendman ‘13**

Stephen Lendman was born in 1934 in Boston, MA. In 1956, he received a BA from Harvard University. Two years of US Army service followed, then an MBA from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania in 1960. After working seven years as a marketing research analyst, he joined the Lendman Group family business in 1967. He remained there until retiring at year end 1999. Writing on major world and national issues began in summer 2005. In early 2007, radio hosting followed. Lendman now hosts the Progressive Radio News Hour on the Progressive Radio Network three times weekly. Major world and national issues are discussed. Lendman is a 2008 Project Censored winner and 2011 Mexican Journalists Club international journalism award recipient. “Venezuela Bashing” – The People’s Voice – July 21st, 2013 – <http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2013/07/21/venezuela-bashing>

Maduro said Venezuela's "fascist right" applauded Powers' comments. **So did supportive Senate committee members.¶** On July 19, a Venezuelan Foreign Ministry statement said:¶ "The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela hereby ends the process of finally normalizing our diplomatic relations" with Washington.¶ In early June, efforts began to do so. They were doomed to fail. America demands total subservience. **Venezuela rejects bullying**. It won't **roll over** irresponsibly.¶ It fiercely **defends its sovereignty**. Its **independence matters most**.¶ In 2010, Venezuela and Washington suspended normal diplomatic relations. They haven't exchanged ambassadors since then.

#### E) Anti-intreventionism

**BBC News ‘13**

“Venezuela 'ends' bid to restore full US ties” – July 20th – <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-23387807>

Venezuela says it has "ended" steps towards restoring diplomatic ties with the US, after comments by the woman nominated as the next envoy to the UN.¶ Samantha Power said this week she would seek to combat what she called the "crackdown on civil society" in countries including Venezuela.¶ She was speaking at a US Senate confirmation hearing on Wednesday.¶ The remarks prompted an angry response from Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro.¶ "The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela hereby ends the process... of finally normalising our diplomatic relations," said Venezuela's foreign ministry in a statement.¶ It objected to Ms Power's "**interventionist agenda**", noting that her "disrespectful opinions" were later endorsed by the state department, "contradicting in tone and in content" earlier statements by Secretary of State John Kerry.

#### F) Snowden

**Grand 13**, 7/6 “Edward Snowden Asylum: Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is Trolling the U.S.”, Gabe Grand is an editorialist for PolicyMic and an avid scholar of Latin American affairs, <http://www.policymic.com/articles/53099/edward-snowden-asylum-venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduro-is-trolling-the-u-s> Mollie

On Friday, Venezuela's recently elected President Nicolás Maduro offered asylum to Edward Snowden, making Venezuela the first country to open its arms to the rogue intelligence contractor. Before a military parade marking Venezuela's independence day, July 5, Maduro announced, "I have decided to offer humanitarian asylum to Edward Snowden so that he can come and live in the homeland of Bolivar and Chavez, away from the persecution of North American imperialism." **"He is a young man who has told the truth, in the spirit of rebellion, about the United States spying on the whole world."** While Maduro's asylum offer may have answered several pressing questions about Snowden's immediate future, **it leaves us to wonder about the motivation behind Maduro's decision.**  **Why, after watching dozens of countries reject Snowden's asylum applications, did Maduro decide to take the whistleblower in?** **What political implications does this move have** **for** the **Maduro** presidency, both in Venezuela and in its diplomatic relations **with the United States?** And why now? It's important to keep in mind that **Maduro is far from secure in his office as Venezuelan president.** In the wake of the death of Hugo Chávez in March, **Maduro rode a wave of pro-Chávez support into office and has been striving to fill his mentor's shoes ever since**. Having pledged to continue the policies of Chávismo**, Maduro has yet to distinguish himself from his predecessor before the Venezuelan people or the international public.** **Granting asylum to Edward Snowden on the anniversary of Venezuela's independence from Spain is a politically genius move that was designed to stick the middle finger to Washington and gain Maduro recognition before the greater Latin American community.** Need proof**? Just take a look at the rhetoric that Maduro employed in his speech.** "**I'd like to announce something in the name of the dignity of Latin America,**" he began. He went on to explain that he had conferred with other Latin American presidents the previous day, and that "Several Latin American governments have expressed their willingness to assume the stance that I am about to announce." **Nicolás Maduro's decision** to extend asylum to Edward Snowden **has**, in fact, **very little to do with Edward Snowden** himself. **It is a symbolic move calculated to invoke Latin American unity and solidarity in the face of what many Latin Americans perceive as the impending threat of imperialism.** Anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America is starting to boil, and Maduro's timing couldn't be better. His announcement comes just days after the United States bullied France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal into obstructing the jet of Bolivian President Evo Morales on the suspicion that Snowden was on board.

#### That’s especially indicative—the cornerstone of Venezuela’s foreign policy’s predicated on anti-US posturing

**Forero and Englund 13** 7/8, Juan Forero and Will Englund, Juan Forero is based in Bogota, Colombia, for The Washington Post and is responsible for covering South America. Before joining The Post in September 2006, he was the Bogota bureau chief for the New York Times, covering the Andean region for six years. A native of Bogota, he has also been a staff writer at the Star-Ledger of Newark, N.J., New York Newsday, the San Diego Union-Tribune and other papers. He has also reported from Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua and other countries., A Pulitzer Prize winner, Will Englund is on his third tour as a Moscow correspondent -- along with his wife, Kathy Lally. In the 1990s he did two stints in Russia for the Baltimore Sun. He was also co-author of a project on shipbreaking that won the Pulitzer for investigative reporting as well as an Overseas Press Club award and a George Polk award. He joined the Post in October 2010. “With Snowden offer, Venezuela’s Maduro is on world stage”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/with-snowden-offer-venezuelas-maduro-is-on-world-stage/2013/07/08/35d83f42-e812-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_story.html> Mollie

BOGOTA, Colombia —**American fugitive Edward Snowden’s diminishing possibilities of remaining free to continue releasing information about secret U.S. surveillance programs increasingly appear to hinge on Venezuela**, which awaited word Monday on whether the former National Security Agency contractor would accept its offer of asylum and fly to the oil-rich country. Bolivia and Nicaragua also say they could give refuge to Snowden, who is on the run from American officials and is thought to be marooned in the vast transit zone of Moscow’s Sheremetyevo International Airport. And the president of communist Cuba, Raúl Castro, on Sunday expressed support for Latin American allies that might take in the 30-year-old computer expert, opening the possibility that Snowden could fly through Havana as a first leg on his flight to asylum. **Among those offering sanctuary to Snowden, anti-imperialist Venezuela stands out: a country with an intense antipathy toward the United States and just enough muscle to make his escape from American law enforcement a possibility. It also appears that Russian officials, eager to end the diplomatic fallout of having Snowden in Moscow, see their close ally, Venezuela, as offering the clearest solution.** **“The situation with Snowden is creating additional tension in relations with Washington that are complex as they are,**” Alexei Pushkov, head of the foreign affairs committee of the lower house of the Russian parliament, told the newspaper Kommersant on Monday.Pushkov, whose comments dependably reflect the Kremlin’s position on foreign affairs, saidthe Snowden saga needed to be settled before President Obama arrives in September to meet withhis Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. “And judging by the way things are unfolding,” Pushkov told the newspaper, “this is how it’s going to be.”Over the weekend, **Pushkov had also said that giving asylum to Snowden in Venezuela could not damage Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, because his government’s relations with Washington are already in tatters. “It can’t get worse,”** Pushkov said in a Twitter message. Late Tuesday afternoon, Pushkov said on Twitter that **Snowden, “as expected,” had accepted Maduro’s offer of asylum,** but he didn’t address the question of how Snowden might get to Caracas. Shortly afterward, the tweet was deleted. Pushkov then tweeted again, claiming he had heard the news about Snowden on Russian television. “Direct all your questions to them,” he wrote. By Tuesday evening, Pushkov had issued yet a third tweet: “According to News 24 [a TV news program], with reference to Maduro, Snowden accepted his offer of asylum. If so, he has found that to be the safest option.” **Newly elected and facing staggering economic problems at home despite the country’s oil wealth, Maduro appears to have made a high-pitched, openly hostile position against** the **Obama** administration **a cornerstone of his government’s foreign policy**. He took his most provocative stand Friday in announcing that Venezuela would take in Snowden. On Monday, Maduro said that a letter from Snowden requesting asylum had been received and that the young American would simply have to decide when to fly to Caracas.

#### G) They will refuse “interference of any kind”

**Neuman ‘13**

WILLIAM NEUMAN – New York Times Andes Region correspondent – “Venezuela Stops Efforts to Improve U.S. Relations” – New York Times – July 20, 2013 – <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/world/americas/venezuela-stops-efforts-to-improve-us-relations.html?_r=0>

Venezuela announced late Friday that **it was stopping** the latest round of off-again-on-again efforts to improve relations with the United States in reaction to comments by the Obama administration’s nominee for United Nations ambassador. ¶ The nominee, Samantha Power, speaking before a Senate committee on Wednesday, said part of her role as ambassador would be to challenge a “crackdown on civil society” in several countries, including Venezuela. President Nicolás Maduro had already lashed out on Thursday at Ms. Power for her remarks, and late on Friday the Foreign Ministry said it was terminating efforts to improve relations with the United States. ¶ Those efforts had inched forward just last month after Secretary of State John Kerry publicly shook hands with the Venezuelan foreign minister, Elías Jaua, during an international meeting in Guatemala — one of the highest-level meetings between officials of the two countries in years.¶ Venezuela “will never accept **interference of any kind** in its internal affairs,” the Foreign Ministry said in a statement, adding that it “considered terminated the process begun in the conversations in Guatemala that had as their goal the regularization of our diplomatic relations.”

#### H) Timing – especially bad now

**Khaleej Times ‘13**

(Editorial Section – “Venezuela-US row” – 21 July 2013 – <http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=/data/editorial/2013/July/editorial_July41.xml&section=editorial>)

WASHINGTON HAS unnecessarily picked up a quarrel with Caracas. The remarks of newly designated ambassador to the United Nations that the US would seek to combat what she called the ‘crackdown’ on civil society in Venezuela has raised a diplomatic storm.¶ Samantha Power, the versatile human rights activist who has worked extensively on genocide, kicked the tin when she went on and on to castigate the neighbour in her backyard in an attempt to please the august members of the Congress hearing her confirmation bid. She shouldn’t have mentioned Venezuela in so many words and also at a time when their bilateral relations are at their lowest ebb. Both the countries do not have diplomatic ties since they de-marched their ambassadors in 2010. Moreover, the US posed itself on the wrong side when it criticised the presidential elections in Venezuela after the death of Hugo Chavez and drew undue condemnation. The last but not the least is the evolving Edward Snowden question, which is posing the biggest issue in their relations with Caracas having extended asylum offer to the fugitive whistleblower.¶ In such a scenario, Samantha could have done a better job by utilising her talent in a secretive-cum-diplomatic manner, rather than drum-beating ethics before the US legislators. Her appointment to the world body was a considerate decision by President Barack Obama and was meant to harness congeniality with her immediate neighbours in the southern hemisphere. Samantha’s remarks have also torpedoed the goodwill gesture that Secretary John Kerry wanted to promote by initiating a dialogue and hopefully moving on to receive each other’s envoys. Samantha should come up with a damage control comment earnestly.

# 1NR

DA o/w and turns the case

We control irrationality --- cyberterror renders the US to be irrational because their cyberbackbone is literally taken out, and they don’t have control of their nuclear weapons --- that’s Fritz. “Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods” and emergency response communications could be disrupted,

**Its most probable**  
**Habiger 10** (Eugene, Retired Air Force General, “ CYBERWARFARE AND CYBERTERRORISM: THE NEED FOR A NEW U.S. STRATEGIC APPROACH,” The Cyber Security Institute, February 1, nkj)  
However, there are reasons to believe that what is going on now amounts to a fundamental shift as opposed to business as usual. Today’s network exploitation or information operation trespasses possess a number of characteristics that suggest that the line between espionage and conflict has been, or is close to being, crossed. (What that suggests for the proper response is a different matter.) First, the number of cyberattacks we are facing is growing significantly. Andrew Palowitch, a former CIA official now consulting with the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which oversees the Defense Department’s Joint Task Force‐Global Network Operations, recently told a meeting of experts that the Defense Department has experienced almost 80,000 computer attacks, and some number of these assaults have actually “reduced” the military’s “operational capabilities.”20 Second, the nature of these attacks is starting to shift from penetration attempts aimed at gathering intelligence (cyber spying) to offensive efforts aimed at taking down systems (cyberattacks). Palowitch put this in stark terms last November, “We are currently in a cyberwar and war is going on today.”21 Third, these recent attacks need to be taken in a broader strategic context. Both Russia and China have stepped up their offensive efforts and taken a much more aggressive cyberwarfare posture. The Chinese have developed an openly discussed cyberwar strategy aimed at achieving electronic dominance over the U.S. and its allies by 2050. In 2007 the Department of Defense reported that for the first time China has developed first strike viruses, marking a major shift from prior investments in defensive measures.22 And in the intervening period China has launched a series of offensive cyber operations against U.S. government and private sector networks and infrastructure. In 2007, Gen. James Cartwright, the former head of STRATCOM and now the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the US‐China Economic and Security Review Commission that China’s ability to launch “denial of service” attacks to overwhelm an IT system is of particular concern. 23 Russia also has already begun to wage offensive cyberwar. At the outset of the recent hostilities with Georgia, Russian assets launched a series of cyberattacks against the Georgian government and its critical infrastructure systems, including media, banking and transportation sites.24 In 2007, cyberattacks that many experts attribute, directly or indirectly, to Russia shut down the Estonia government’s IT systems. Fourth, the current geopolitical context must also be factored into any effort to gauge the degree of threat of cyberwar. The start of the new Obama Administration has begun to help reduce tensions between the United States and other nations. And,the new administration has taken initial steps to improve bilateral relations specifically with both China and Russia. However, it must be said that over the last few years **the posture of both the Chinese and Russian governments toward America has clearly become more assertive, and at times even aggressive.** Some commentators have talked about the prospects of **a cyber Pearl Harbor**, and the pattern of Chinese and Russian behavior to date gives reason for concern along these lines: **both nations have offensive cyberwarfare strategies in place**; both nations have taken the cyber equivalent of building up their forces; both nations now regularly probe our cyber defenses looking for gaps to be exploited; both nations have begun taking actions that cross the line from cyberespionage to cyberaggression; and, our bilateral relations with both nations are increasingly fractious and complicated by areas of marked, direct competition. Clearly, there a sharp differences between current U.S. relations with these two nations and relations between the US and Japan just prior to World War II. However, from a strategic defense perspective, there are enough warning signs to warrant preparation. In addition to the threat of cyberwar, the limited resources required to carry out even a large scale cyberattack also makes likely the potential for a significant cyberterror attack against the United States. However, the lack of a long list of specific incidences of cyberterrorism should provide no comfort. There is strong evidence to suggest that al Qaeda has the ability to conduct cyberterror attacks against the United States and its allies. Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are extremely active in cyberspace, using these technologies to communicate among themselves and others, carry out logistics, recruit members, and wage information warfare. For example, al Qaeda leaders used email to communicate with the 9‐11 terrorists and the 9‐11 terrorists used the Internet to make travel plans and book flights. Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda members routinely post videos and other messages to online sites to communicate. Moreover, there is evidence of efforts that **al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations** are actively developing cyberterrorism capabilities and seeking to carry out cyberterrorist attacks. For example, the Washington Post has reported that “U.S. investigators have found evidence in the logs that mark a browser's path through the Internet that al Qaeda operators spent time on sites that offer software and programming instructions for the digital switches that run power, water, transport and communications grids. In some interrogations . . . al Qaeda prisoners have described intentions, in general terms, to use those tools.”25 Similarly, a 2002 CIA report on the cyberterror threat to a member of the Senate stated that al Qaeda and Hezbollah have become "more adept at using the internet and computer technologies.”26 The FBI has issued bulletins stating that, “U. S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies have received indications that Al Qaeda members have sought information on Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems available on multiple SCADA‐related web sites.”27 In addition a number of jihadist websites, such as 7hj.7hj.com, teach computer attack and hacking skills in the service of Islam.28 While al Qaeda may lack the cyber‐attack capability of nations like Russia and China, there is every reason to believe its operatives, and those of its ilk, are as capable as the cyber criminals and hackers who routinely effect great harm on the world’s digital infrastructure generally and American assets specifically. In fact, perhaps, the most troubling indication of the level of the cyberterrorist threat is the countless, serious non‐terrorist cyberattacks routinely carried out by criminals, hackers, disgruntled insiders, crime syndicates and the like. If run‐of‐the‐mill criminals and hackers can threaten powergrids, hack vital military networks, steal vast sums of money, take down a city’s of traffic lights, compromise the Federal Aviation Administration’s air traffic control systems, among other attacks, it is overwhelmingly likely that terrorists can carry out similar, if not more malicious attacks. Moreover, even if the world’s terrorists are unable to breed these skills, they can certainly buy them. There are untold numbers of cybermercenaries around the world—sophisticated hackers with advanced training who would be willing to offer their services for the right price. Finally, given the nature of our understanding of cyber threats, there is always the possibility that we have already been the victim or a cyberterrorist attack, or such an attack has already been set but not yet effectuated, and we don’t know it yet. Instead, a well‐designed cyberattack has the capacity cause widespread chaos, sow societal unrest, undermine national governments, spread paralyzing fear and anxiety, and create a state of utter turmoil, all without taking a single life. A sophisticated cyberattack could throw a nation’s banking and finance system into chaos causing markets to crash, prompting runs on banks, degrading confidence in markets, perhaps even putting the nation’s currency in play and making the government look helpless and hapless. In today’s difficult economy, imagine how Americans would react if vast sums of money were taken from their accounts and their supporting financial records were destroyed. A truly nefarious cyberattacker could carry out an attack in such a way (akin to Robin Hood) as to engender populist support and deepen rifts within our society, thereby making efforts to restore the system all the more difficult. A modestly advanced enemy could use a cyberattack to shut down (if not physically damage) one or more regional power grids. An entire region could be cast into total darkness, power‐dependent systems could be shutdown. An attack on one or more regional power grids could also cause cascading effects that could jeopardize our entire national grid. When word leaks that the blackout was caused by a cyberattack, the specter of a foreign enemy capable of sending the entire nation into darkness would only increase the fear, turmoil and unrest. While the finance and energy sectors are considered prime targets for a cyberattack, an attack on any of the 17 delineated critical infrastructure sectors could have a major impact on the United States. For example, our healthcare system is already technologically driven and the Obama Administration’s e‐health efforts will only increase that dependency. A cyberattack on the U.S. e‐health infrastructure could send our healthcare system into chaos and put countless of lives at risk. Imagine if emergency room physicians and surgeons were suddenly no longer able to access vital patient information. A cyberattack on our nation’s water systems could likewise cause widespread disruption. An attack on the control systems for one or more dams could put entire communities at risk of being inundated, and could create ripple effects across the water, agriculture, and energy sectors. Similar water control system attacks could be used to at least temporarily deny water to otherwise arid regions, impacting everything from the quality of life in these areas to agriculture. In 2007, the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit determined that the destruction from a single wave of cyberattacks on critical infrastructures could exceed $700 billion, which would be the rough equivalent of 50 Katrina‐esque hurricanes hitting the United States all at the same time.29 Similarly, one IT security source has estimated that the impact of a single day cyberwar attack that focused on and disrupted U.S. credit and debit card transactions would be approximately $35 billion.30 Another way to gauge the potential for harm is in comparison to other similar noncyberattack infrastructure failures. For example, the August 2003 regional power grid blackout is estimated to have cost the U.S. economy up to $10 billion, or roughly .1 percent of the nation’s GDP. 31 That said, a cyberattack of the exact same magnitude would most certainly have a much larger impact. The origin of the 2003 blackout was almost immediately disclosed as an atypical system failure having nothing to do with terrorism. This made the event both less threatening and likely a single time occurrence. Had it been disclosed that the event was the result of an attack that could readily be repeated the impacts would likely have grown substantially, if not exponentially. Additionally, a cyberattack could also be used to disrupt our nation’s defenses or distract our national leaders in advance of a more traditional conventional or strategic attack. Many military leaders actually believe that such a disruptive cyber pre‐offensive is the most effective use of offensive cyber capabilities. This is, in fact, the way Russia utilized cyberattackers—whether government assets, governmentdirected/ coordinated assets, or allied cyber irregulars—in advance of the invasion of Georgia. Widespread distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks were launched on the Georgian governments IT systems. Roughly a day later Russian armor rolled into Georgian territory. The cyberattacks were used to prepare the battlefield; they denied the Georgian government a critical communications tool isolating it from its citizens and degrading its command and control capabilities precisely at the time of attack. In this way, these attacks were the functional equivalent of conventional air and/or missile strikes on a nation’s communications infrastructure.32 One interesting element of the Georgian cyberattacks has been generally overlooked: On July 20th, weeks before the August cyberattack, the website of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was overwhelmed by a more narrowly focused, but technologically similar DDOS attack.33 This should be particularly chilling to American national security experts as our systems undergo the same sorts of focused, probing attacks on a constant basis. The ability of an enemy to use a cyberattack to counter our offensive capabilities or soften our defenses for a wider offensive against the United States is much more than mere speculation. In fact, in Iraq it is already happening. Iraq insurgents are now using off‐the‐shelf software (costing just $26) to hack U.S. drones (costing $4.5 million each), allowing them to intercept the video feed from these drones.34 By hacking these drones the insurgents have succeeded in greatly reducing one of our most valuable sources of real‐time intelligence and situational awareness. If our enemies in Iraq are capable of such an effective cyberattack against one of our more sophisticated systems, consider what a more technologically advanced enemy could do. At the strategic level, in 2008, as the United States Central Command was leading wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan, a cyber intruder compromised the security of the Command and sat within its IT systems, monitoring everything the Command was doing. 35 This time the attacker simply gathered vast amounts of intelligence. However, it is clear that the attacker could have used this access to wage cyberwar—altering information, disrupting the flow of information, destroying information, taking down systems—against the United States forces already at war. Similarly, during 2003 as the United States prepared for and began the War in Iraq, the IT networks of the Department of Defense were hacked 294 times.36 By August of 2004, with America at war, these ongoing attacks compelled then‐Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to write in a memo that, "Recent exploits have reduced operational capabilities on our networks."37 This wasn’t the first time that our national security IT infrastructure was penetrated immediately in advance of a U.S. military option.38 In February of 1998 the Solar Sunrise attacks systematically compromised a series of Department of Defense networks. What is often overlooked is that these attacks occurred during the ramp up period ahead of potential military action against Iraq. The attackers were able to obtain vast amounts of sensitive information—information that would have certainly been of value to an enemy’s military leaders. There is no way to prove that these actions were purposefully launched with the specific intent to distract American military assets or degrade our capabilities. However, such ambiguities—the inability to specifically attribute actions and motives to actors—are the very nature of cyberspace. Perhaps, these repeated patterns of behavior were mere coincidence, or perhaps they weren’t. The potential that an enemy might use a cyberattack to soften physical defenses, increase the gravity of harms from kinetic attacks, or both, significantly increases the potential harms from a cyberattack. Consider the gravity of the threat and risk if an enemy, rightly or wrongly, believed that it could use a cyberattack to degrade our strategic weapons capabilities. Such an enemy might be convinced that it could win a war—conventional or **even nuclear**—against the United States. The effect of this would be to undermine our deterrence‐based defenses, making us significantly more at risk of a **major** **war**.

Fastest escalation

Cimbala 99 (Stephen Cimbala, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University Delaware County Campus, Summer 1999, Armed Forces & Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal)

The nuclear shadow over the information age remains significant. The essence of information warfare is in subtlety and deception: the manipulation of uncertainty. The essence of nuclear deterrence lies in the credible and certain threat of retaliation backed by an information environment accepted and trusted by both sides in a partly competitive, partly conflictual relationship. Nuclear assets may themselves become the targets of cyberwarriors. Triumphalism about the RMA in high technology conventional weapons overlooks asymmetrical strategies that might appeal to U.S. opponents. Among these might be the reciprocal use of information warfare to deny U.S. access in time of need to a timely nuclear response or to a credible nuclear threat. But even more problematic is the potential collision course between intentional information warfare and unintended side effects when cyberwar is waged against a nuclear armed state, especially one with a non-Western culture. Neither the status of nuclear forces in the new world order, nor all of the military implications of the information revolution, are apparent now. There are reasons to suppose that the strategies and technologies of information warfare will develop along one track, whereas efforts to control nuclear weapons spread and to establish the safety and security of existing nuclear arsenals will involve a different community of specialists and attentive publics. Nevertheless, there are sufficient grounds to be concerned that a too successful menu of information strategies may contribute to a failure of nuclear deterrence in the form of accidental/inadvertent war or escalation. Unplanned interactions between infowarriors and deterrers could have unfortunate byproducts.

And, it turns the case

#### Turns naval power

Carafano 7 (James, Ph.D., Deputy Driector – Institute for International Studies and Director of the Center for Foreign Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation, and Andrew Gudgel, “Nanotechnology and National Security: Small Changes, Big Impact”, Heritage Backgrounder, 9-21, http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology -and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact)

Nanotechnology is an emerging transformational technology that promises wide and dual-use applica­tions in many fields, particularly national security. The United States is the world's acknowledged leader in nanoscience, but stiff international competition is nar­rowing America's lead. Many other countries, specifi­cally European nations and China, have large, established nanotechnology initiatives. Most commer­cial applications of nanotechnology are still nascent. In the near term, the most promising develop­ments for national security will likely come from government research rather than from the applica­tion of commercial off-the-shelf nanotechnologies. To meet national security needs in the near term, the U.S. government needs to adopt new legislative and policy innovations, including promoting long-term research, distributing federal grants more widely, and promoting scientific travel and exchanges to maintain a supply of skilled experts. Over the long term, the government should remove capital and regulatory barriers to lower the cost of research and emerging technologies and should address safety and environmental issues. What Is Nanotechnology? "Nanotechnology" is derived from "nano," the Greek word for dwarf. It involves manipulating and manufacturing particles at the microscopic and even atomic levels, between 1 nanometer and 100 nanom­eters. By comparison, a human hair is roughly 100,000 nanometers wide. Combining the ability to manipulate molecular structures with advances in genomics and other bio­logical sciences has created a wealth of new research opportunities. By putting these unique properties to work, scientists are developing highly beneficial dual-use products in medicine, electronics, and many other industries that will also provide enor­mous defense and homeland security capabilities. These scientific developments are creating new industries. The market opportunities are so sub­stantial that many government and business lead­ers describe nanotechnology as "the next industrial revolution." Nanotechnology was incorporated into manu­factured goods worth more than $30 billion in 2005, and this figure is projected to reach $2.6 tril­lion by 2015.[[1]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn1" \o ") However, since nanotechnology is relatively new, government research is critical for developing applications of this new technology, par­ticularly in the field of national security. A Small Beginning The birth of nanotechnology can be traced to 1981, when Gerd Binning and Heinrich Rohrer, sci­entists at IBM Research, Zurich, created the scan­ning tunneling microscope (STM). The STM was the first instrument capable of performing opera­tions at the atomic scale, such as adding or remov­ing individual electrons to or from atoms and molecules. It gave researchers the unprecedented ability to change materials "from the bottom up." The two scientists won the Nobel Prize in physics for their invention in 1986.[[2]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact#_ftn2) Within a few years, scientists had demonstrated the capability to manufacture nanoparticles. The discovery of fullerines (isomers or molecules of pure carbon that can be manipulated into unique structures, such as "buckyballs") in 1985 and car­bon nanotubes (manufactured one-atom-thick sheets of carbon rolled into cylinders) in 1991 sparked further interest in nanotechnology. These molecules have novel properties that make them potentially useful in a wide variety of applica­tions, including electronics, optics, and other fields of material science. They also exhibit extraordinary strength and unique electrical properties. Carbon nanotubes are 100 times stronger than steel at one-sixth the weight, while buckyballs are hollow, mak­ing them well-suited for use as carriers of drugs or other materials.[[3]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact#_ftn3) Nanotechnology Today Current commercial nanotechnological prod­ucts are limited to first-generation passive applica­tions, such as nanoparticles, coatings, catalysts, and nanocomposites (materials formed from organic and inorganic components at the nanos­cale). Products include cosmetics, automobile parts, clothing, and sports equipment. Research is quickly leading nanotechnology to converge with other fields, including biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science. Using techniques commonly found in semicon­ductor manufacture, researchers have created adjustable "quantum dots" by making "wells" and "corrals" on silicon chips where individual elec­trons can be trapped and held. The shell of elec­trons around every atom determines its properties, such as color and electrical conductivity. By filling these quantum corrals with differing numbers of electrons, researchers can create artificial "atoms" that have the same properties as any element on- or beyond-the periodic table, although these "atoms" are temporary and lack nuclei. Simply adding or subtracting electrons from these wells changes the type of "atom." Grids of quantum corrals built across the surface of a silicon semiconductor chip would allow the creation of artificial molecules, which would theoretically allow the entire chip to have-at least on its sur­face-the physical properties of almost any mate­rial imaginable. Some aspects of current nanotechnology also blur the line with biotechnology. For example, nanoparticles (clusters of tens to hundreds of indi­vidual atoms) have been used in medical research to fight diseases, including cancer. Researchers are also exploring ways to manipulate the genetic code that have tremendous implications in the diagnosis and treatment of diseases. A nanoparticle that encapsu­lates medication with biomolecules could be designed to bind only to the cells that need the medicine. Such research could also affect other dis­ease research and possibly change the medical response to national catastrophic disaster.[[4]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact#_ftn4) Nanophotonics is another growing field of nano­technology research. Photonics, which uses light, is the ability to control photons for the purpose of car­rying, processing, storing, or displaying informa­tion. Well-known applications of photonics include fiberoptic cable, television screens, computer dis­plays, and laser and imaging systems. In nanophotonics, scientists control the mor­phology of materials and, as a result, can now change how a material refracts light. Thus, nano­photonics is not simply the scaling-down of existing systems, but utilizing physics, functionalities, and design strategies that are different from regular pho­tonics to produce tiny waveguides, microscopes on a single chip, better optical communications equip­ment, and chemical and biological sensors.[[5]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn5" \o ") National Security Implications In 2000, the federal government established the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) to pro­mote nanotechnology research at the federal level. The NNI is managed by the Nanoscale Science Engineering and Technology Subcommittee of the National Science and Technology Council, an inter­agency organization of 26 federal agencies that coordinates planning, budgeting, and program implementation among defense and national secu­rity stakeholders. This structure is vital to dissemi­nating information and fostering cross-disciplinary networks and partnerships. Both the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are NNI members. In addition to funding research, federal support through the NNI provides crucial funds for the cre­ation of nanotech support infrastructure, such as nanoscale research labs, and for educational re­sources to develop a skilled workforce capable of advancing nanotechnology. These programs en­courage business, including small business, to pur­sue nanotechnology opportunities.[[6]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn6" \o ") Military Applications. All branches of the U.S. military are currently conducting nanotechnology research, including the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Office of Naval Research (ONR), Army Research Office (ARO), and Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR). The Air Force is heavily involved in research of composite materials.[[7]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn7" \o ") Among other projects, the Navy Research Laboratory's Institute for Nanoscience has studied quantum dots for application in nanopho­tonics and identifying biological materials.[[8]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn8" \o ") In May 2003, the Army and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology opened the Institute for Soldier Nano­technologies, a joint research collaboration to develop technologies to protect soldiers better.[[9]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact#_ftn9) Nanotechnology has numerous military applica­tions. The most obvious are in materials science. Carbon nanotubes and diamond films and fibers have higher strength-to-weight ratios than steel, which allows for lighter and stronger armor and parts for vehicles, equipment, and aircraft. Such upgraded military Humvees would better protect soldiers from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and small-arms fire. In another application, adding nickel nanostrands (ropes of material no wider than a few molecules), which can conduct electricity, could make aircraft more resistant to lightning strikes. The nickel strands also have magnetic properties that may prove useful in filters and energy storage devices.[[10]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact#_ftn10) The U.S. Army is actively pursuing nanotech­nology for use in soldiers' uniforms, equipment, and armor. As part of the planned Objective Force Warrior Soldier Ensemble, the Army hopes to cre­ate a uniform that provides flexible armor protec­tion for soldiers' limbs through the use of shear thickening liquids that solidify when force is applied to them. This would greatly reduce the weight that a soldier must carry. (Current body armor weighs around 25 pounds.) Other features of the planned uniform include medical sensors, medical treatment capabilities, communications, and individual environmental control for the soldier and integrated thermal, chemical, and biological sensing systems woven into the garment's fabric.[[11]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn11" \o ") Nanotechnology would allow for more precise control of fuel combustion and detonation of explosives. Explosives and propellants could be constructed atom by atom to optimal particle sizes and ratios of ingredients so that the materials approach their theoretical limits of energy release. This would lead to smaller, more powerful rock­ets, propellants, warheads, bombs, and other explosive devices. For slower release of energy, nanotechnology would allow for more powerful batteries, fuel cells, photovoltaic panels, and perhaps even more exotic methods of generating electrical power. Researchers at the Georgia Institute of Technology recently developed piezoelectric fibers, which someday may be used in fabrics that generate their own electricity, completely eliminating the need for batteries.[[12]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn12" \o ") In electronics, nanotechnology would allow the creation of ever-smaller computers and sensors, leading to integrated packages that could sense, dis­criminate, decide, report information, and provide control input to other devices. For example, tires that sense the surface over which they are traveling could automatically adjust tire pressure to maintain optimal traction. Smart sensors could be used in single-chip chemical and biological agent laboratories that would be smaller, faster, and more accurate than current testing methods. They could also be attached to miniature disposable sensor platforms, allowing monitoring of a large battlespace at mini­mal cost, effort, and danger to soldiers. In the more distant future, combining nanocom­puters, sensors, and nanomechanical architectures into one system would make possible autono­mously targeted and guided projectiles, such as bul­lets and rockets. Nanotechnology could also improve communications and information process­ing, whether on the battlefield or with the Oval Office, through microscopic computers, switches, lasers, mirrors, detectors, and other optical and electrical devices. The laws of physics and optics change funda­mentally at the near-atomic level. Instead of being masked by the manipulation of particles on the sur­face, materials can be changed at the optical elec­tronic level. Materials that display one optical or electronic property at the macro level may display a different property at the nanometer level. Remark­able mechanisms become possible, such as nega­tively refractive optics that bend light at angles and in directions otherwise impossible.[[13]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn13" \o ") Such devices could lead to the development of lenses that focus almost instantaneously and light-bending camou­flage that changes as the solider or vehicle moves. One theoretical and exotic use of nanophotonic materials would be fiberoptic waveguides that actu­ally strengthen the light beams passing through them. These could be used for long-distance, strate­gic-level communications systems or high-power narrow-beam lasers. With nanophotonics, optical computing, data storage, and signal processing become possible. If the Defense Department is to remain a leader in exploiting nanotechnology, the Pentagon must ensure that it adequately understands how nano­technology could be exploited for U.S. security and competitive advantage. Homeland Security Applications. Only 0.25 percent of the government's 2004 funding for nan­otechnology goes to the Department of Homeland Security. This is inadequate given that nanotechnol­ogy could play a major role in advancing the DHS capabilities. Nanomaterials could be used to create highly sensitive sensors capable of detecting hazard­ous materials in the air. For example, carbon-based nanotubes are relatively inexpensive and consume minimal power. Other areas of nanotechnology pertinent to homeland security are emergency responder de­vices. Lightweight communications systems that require almost no power and have a large contact radius would give rescuers more flexibility. Nano­tech robots could be used to disarm bombs and save trapped victims, reducing the risks to rescue workers. Enlisting the Private Sector In the United States, the commercial nano­science industry is composed of traditional indus­trial sectors, newly formed startups, Fortune 500 companies, and academic research institutions. These groups will play a significant role in future developments of nanotechnology. The most recent analysis estimates that nanoscience will produce $2.6 trillion in economic output by 2015.[[14]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn14" \o ") The U.S. is currently the global leader in nano­technology. The National Nanotechnology Initiative coordinates over $1 billion in annual federal research and grants. Total U.S. public and private spending on nanotechnology research and develop­ment totals about $3 billion annually, or one-third of the estimated $9 billion that is spent worldwide.[[15]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn15" \o ") Global competition in nanotechnology is fierce, and many countries are challenging the U.S.'s supremacy, specifically in the European Union and Asia. The EU is strengthening its research and development capabilities by promot­ing partnerships among companies and universi­ties through its Nanosciences/Nanotechnology Action Plan for Europe. The Chinese government has implemented initiatives that employ over twice as many engineers as are working in nano­technology in the U.S.[[16]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn16" \o ") Thus, U.S. government-sponsored research is still vital if America is to remain a global leader in the national security applications of nanotechnology. Toward the Future Congress and the Administration have done much to encourage the development of nano­science. The challenge is to maintain this momen­tum, facilitating commercial innovation and the application of new advances for national security purposes. A few key initiatives would bolster Amer­ica's global leadership in the science of small things. Smarter Funding. In the near term, government research and development funds will continue to play a critical role in jump-starting national security innovations in nanotechnology. Congress should continue to provide strong support for nanoscience research programs in the Department of Defense and other federal agencies that support national security purposes. Big Industry is currently averse to risk and is not providing the innovations needed for national secu­rity. In fact, investments in the private sector have been concentrated in just a few mature nanotech companies. In the first quarter of 2005, almost all of the venture capital invested in the nanotech indus­try went to four companies: NanoTex ($33 millon), Nanomix ($17 million), Nantero ($17 million), and NanoOpto ($12 million).[[17]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn17" \o ") The NNI needs to focus grants on the companies willing to pursue national security research. In doing so, however, it must walk a fine line between fostering cutting-edge technology advances and establishing a form of corporate welfare. Funding of the private sector should be limited to projects with such prohibitive risk and entry costs that companies would otherwise be unable to pursue them on their own. Interagency Coordination. The DOD recently cited maintaining a consistent vision and stable funding as critical to future nanotechnology research and development.[[18]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn18" \o ") Although federal agencies con­tinue to coordinate through the NNI, each agency retains full control of its own budget decisions and sets its own research priorities. The National Academy of Sciences has con­cluded that the "NNI is successfully establishing R&D programs with wider impact than could have been expected from separate agency funding with­out coordination." Increased coordination within the NNI would produce a centralized list of priori­ties and leverage resources even more effectively.[[19]](http://heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/09/Nanotechnology-and-National-Security-Small-Changes-Big-Impact" \l "_ftn19" \o ") Reform of Visa Issuance and Management. Congress needs to promote policies that continue to bring the best and the brightest in nanotechnology to study and work in the United States. Current visa policies are making it increasingly difficult to recruit students and scientists and to hold scientific confer­ences in the United States. The nation's security and competitiveness relies heavily on people's ability to travel to the United States, but the current visa system is unnecessarily challenging, depriving the United States of many of the world's best and brightest scientists, students, and entrepreneurs. Long wait times for personal interviews are among the most frequently cited fac­tors that make travel to the United States difficult.

#### Turns Russian aggression

Wadhwa 10 Vivek, Visiting Scholar at the School of Information at UC-Berkeley, Senior Research Associate at Harvard Law School and Director of Research at the Center for Entrepreneurship and Research Commercialization at Duke University, “Can Russia Build A Silicon Valley?”, 9/12, http://techcrunch.com/2010/09/12/can-russia-build-a-silicon-valley/

3. Open the doors. From 1995 to 2005, 52% of Silicon Valley tech companies were founded by immigrants. These foreign-born workers brought diversity and new ideas with them. They caused Americans to work harder and think smarter. And they helped give the U.S. its huge global advantage. But because of flawed immigration policies, future generations of entrepreneurs are now leaving the U.S. in droves. Take a page from Chile’s book—invite them over and offer some incentives. Russia doesn’t have the proximity to the U.S. or the climate advantage that Chile does, so this will be harder. But it may be able to attract some of the graduating students and skilled workers who are returning to Eastern Europe and South Asia. 4. Take advantage of the Patent-Free Zone. Over previous decades, very few western companies have bothered to file patents in Russia or in the other countries whose economies are now growing rapidly. As I explained in this piece, there is a huge opportunity to freely use the wealth of proven intellectual property that has already been created. Russian engineers and scientists can be solving problems for most of the world—in fields such as solar power; electric cars; mobile technologies for the poor; disease eradication; medical devices; and food processing. They can combine all sorts of technologies to produce solutions that patent restrictions prevent from being easily being created in the U.S. Any breakthroughs will ultimately benefit the patent owners when licenses are obtained for use in the West. 5. Connect Russia’s engineers with their counterparts in the U.S. The Russian government should create the resources needed for American tech companies to find and hire the right Russian talent. It may even want to subsidize salaries for the first year or set up a fund that invests in Silicon Valley startups that hire Russians. This is a win—win: American startups here get desperately needed seed funding and talent, and Russians gain experience and knowledge of markets and establish valuable contacts. 6. Invest in capacity-building networks such as those being developed by The New York Academy of Sciences. The academy has created an alliance of research universities and academic medical centers which are linked to industry. It has enrolled more than 6000 doctoral students and post-docs and built about 25 multi-institutional communities of researchers and students in multi-disciplinary fields. These could be linked to similar Russian networks. Imagine the good that can come from stronger ties between the engineers and scientists of all nations: new innovations, solutions to world problems, and more jobs and economic growth.

1. **Immigration reform key to US-Latin American relations:**

Arturo Lopez-**Levy**, 11/24/20**12** (doctoral candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies of the University of Denver, “The Latin American Gorilla,” <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/opinion/the-latin-american-gorilla-318169.html>, Accessed 1/23/2013, CMR)

**Few political acts would have a greater effect on U.S.-Latin American relations than the naturalization of millions of Hispanics over the next decade**. President **Obama announced that immigration reform would be a legislative priority in his second term during the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena.**¶ **It is not only a domestic but a foreign policy promise.** The countries that have the largest number of undocumented immigrants in the United States are the same ones that have free-trade agreements: Mexico, Central America, and Colombia. These are also the countries with the greatest need for a coordinated effort against organized crime and drug and arms trafficking.¶ Establishing a path to citizenship for millions of undocumented immigrants would make border control more manageable, and it would also lead to greater demand for the legal immigration of families and circular movement between the United States and immigrants’ countries of origin. **Comprehensive U.S. immigration reform would have a very significant positive impact on tourism, remittances, investment**, and the voting preferences of expatriates from those countries.

Conceded the link in the 2ac – this should be a reason they

The only argument on this flow is that they should outweigh, but my whole overview